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Lingering historical animosities between Japan and its Northeast Asian neighbors—
China and South Korea—inhibit improvements in Japan’s bilateral relationships with 
these countries and contribute to regional instability. One of the ways Japan antagonizes 
its neighbors is when the Japanese prime minister pays tribute to Japanese war dead 
through ceremonial worship at the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo—an event that Chinese and 
Koreans criticize as honoring Japanese imperialism. When Japanese prime ministers visit 
Yasukuni, they elicit responses from Beijing and Seoul that are widely known. What is 
less understood is what these responses can reveal about the starkly different political 
systems these two countries employ. The study examines 64 Japanese prime ministerial 
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine since 1951 and the resultant responses from Beijing and 
Seoul, and argues that the difference in political system had little impact on the 
approaches both governments took to these visits. While political systems may not have 
shaped the responses, they were important in the way each government responded to 
public opinion. The thesis concludes that when either government objected to official 
visits to Yasukuni, the underlying motivation for both governments was and remains the 
same: To prevent a resurgence of Japanese militarism. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A.  IMPORTANCE ................................................................................................2 
B.  THE LITERATURE ........................................................................................4 
1.  China .....................................................................................................5 
2.  The Republic of Korea.........................................................................9 
3.  Japan ...................................................................................................11 
C.  METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES ...........................................................13 
D.  THESIS OVERVIEW ...................................................................................15 
II.  SHINTO AND YASUKUNI ......................................................................................17 
A.  SHINTO ..........................................................................................................17 
B.  YASUKUNI ....................................................................................................18 
1.  History of the Shrine ..........................................................................18 
2.  Enshrinement .....................................................................................19 
3.  Politicization of Yasukuni .................................................................20 
a.  Prime Minister Visits to Yasukuni..........................................20 
b.  Capacity of Prime Minister Visits ...........................................23 
c.  Class-A War Criminals ...........................................................23 
C.  CONCLUDING REMARKS ........................................................................25 
III.  POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND STATE LEADERSHIP .........................................27 
A.  POLITICAL SYSTEMS ...............................................................................27 
1.  Consolidated Democracies ................................................................27 
2.  Transitional Democracies ..................................................................28 
3.  Authoritarianism................................................................................29 
B.  THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: POLITICAL SYSTEM 
AND STATE LEADERSHIP ........................................................................30 
1.  Mao Era Authoritarianism ...............................................................31 
2.  Deng Era Authoritarianism ..............................................................35 
3.  Post-Tiananmen Authoritarianism ..................................................38 
C.  THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: POLITICAL SYSTEM AND STATE 
LEADERSHIP ...............................................................................................39 
1.  Authoritarian South Korea (1948–1988) .........................................39 
2.  Democratization (1988-present) .......................................................44 
D.  CONCLUDING REMARKS ........................................................................45 
IV.  BEIJING’S RESPONSE TO JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER VISITS TO 
YASUKUNI ................................................................................................................47 
A.  YASUKUNI VISITS DURING THE MAO ERA .......................................47 
1.  Yoshida Shigeru (1948–1954) ...........................................................48 
2.  Kishi Nobusuke (1957–1960) .............................................................49 
3.  Ikeda Hayato (1960–1964) .................................................................50 
4.  Sato Eisaku (1964–1972) ...................................................................51 
5.  Tanaka Kakuei (1972–1974) .............................................................54 
 viii
6.  Miki Takeo (1974–1976) ....................................................................55 
B.  DENG ERA YASUKUNI VISITS ................................................................55 
1.  Fukuda Takeo (1976–1978) ...............................................................56 
2.  Ohira Masayoshi (1978–1980) ..........................................................57 
3.  Suzuki Zenko (1980–1982) ................................................................58 
4.  Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982–1987) ......................................................60 
C.  POST-TIANANMEN YASUKUNI VISITS ................................................63 
1.  Hashimoto Ryotaro (1996–1998) ......................................................63 
2.  Koizumi Junichiro (2001–2006) ........................................................64 
D.  ANALYSIS OF BEIJING’S RESPONSES .................................................67 
1.  Beijing’s Responses by the Numbers ...............................................67 
2.  Chinese Trends and Explanations ....................................................67 
E.  CONCLUDING REMARKS ........................................................................69 
V.  SEOUL’S RESPONSE TO JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER VISITS TO 
YASUKUNI ................................................................................................................71 
A.  AUTHORITARIAN SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSES TO YASUKUNI .....................................................................71 
1.  Yoshida Shigeru (1948–1954) ...........................................................72 
2.  Kishi Nobusuke (1957–1960) .............................................................72 
3.  Ikeda Hayato (1960–1964) .................................................................73 
4.  Sato Eisaku (1964–1972) ...................................................................73 
5.  Tanaka Kakuei (1972–1974) .............................................................74 
6.  Miki Takeo (1974–1976) ....................................................................77 
7.  Fukuda Takeo (1976–1978) ...............................................................77 
8.  Ohira Masayoshi (1978–1980) ..........................................................78 
9.  Suzuki Zenko (1980–1982) ................................................................79 
10.  Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982–1987) ......................................................81 
B.  TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACY SOUTH KOREAN 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO YASUKUNI.......................................82 
1.  Hashimoto Ryotaro (1996–1998) ......................................................83 
2.  Koizumi Junichiro (2001–2006) ........................................................83 
C.  ANALYSIS OF SEOUL’S RESPONSES ....................................................84 
1.  Seoul’s Responses by the Numbers ..................................................84 
2.  South Korean Trends and Explanations..........................................85 
D.  CONCLUDING REMARKS ........................................................................87 
VI.  COMPARING POLITICAL SYSTEMS: SIMILARITIES AND 
DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSE TO YASUKUNI .................................................89 
A.  SIMILARITIES: POLITICAL SYSTEM HAD MINIMAL IMPACT ....89 
1.  Similar-Ignore ....................................................................................90 
2.  Similar-Protest ...................................................................................90 
B.  DIFFERENCES: POLITICAL SYSTEM HAD SIGNIFICANT 
IMPACT .........................................................................................................90 
C.  POLITICIZATION TOPICS: FACT OR FICTION? ...............................91 
1.  War Criminals ....................................................................................91 
2.  Official Capacity of Visits .................................................................93 
 ix
3.  Summary .............................................................................................93 
D.  CONCLUDING REMARKS ........................................................................94 
VII.  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................97 
A.  THE LITERATURE, THE HISTORY, AND THE DATA .......................98 
1.  The Literature ....................................................................................98 
2.  The History .........................................................................................98 
3.  The Data ..............................................................................................98 
B.  POLITICAL SYSTEMS ...............................................................................99 
C.  THE CASE STUDIES ...................................................................................99 
1.  The PRC: Changing Leadership, Changing Trends ......................99 
2.  The ROK: Changing Government, Changing Trends .................100 
3.  Comparisons .....................................................................................101 
D.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN .................................................101 
E.  CONCLUDING REMARKS ......................................................................103 
APPENDIX. RESPONSE COMPARISON CHART........................................................105 
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................111 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
CMC Central Military Commission 
CPC Communist Party of China 
CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
DPJ Democratic Party of Japan 
FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
FIFA Federation Internationale de Football Association 
GLF Great Leap Forward 
GPCR Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
IMTFE International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
KMT Kuomintang 
LDP Liberal Democratic Party (of Japan) 
LT Long-Term (trade agreement) 
MHW Ministry of Health and Welfare 
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
PLA People’s Liberation Army 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
ROC Republic of China 
ROK Republic of Korea 
SCAP Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 










Many people helped me create this thesis and are deserving of recognition. First, I 
would like to thank those professors in the Naval Postgraduate School’s National 
Security Affairs Department for their instruction and perspectives. Specifically, I would 
like to thank my advisors, Professors Alice Miller and Robert Weiner. Your seminars, 
guidance, and insights were instrumental towards the completion of this thesis. I am 
extremely appreciative of the time and energy you devoted to this project, and I am 
thankful for your mentorship, both over the course of this project and during my study at 
the Naval Postgraduate School. I am also very appreciative to Greta Marlatt at Dudley 
Knox Library. Your research assistance was instrumental in helping me garner facts and 
information needed for the thesis. 
Secondly, I would like to thank the many National Security Affairs Department 
classmates I had the privilege to serve with and learn from. Your experiences helped me 
gain insights on Northeast Asia that this project otherwise would have lacked. 
Finally, I must thank my loving wife for her support during this endeavor. You 
gave me the most important intangibles that I needed: encouragement and motivation. 
Without your help, I would not have completed this thesis. 
 xvi




When assessing the complex historical relationships that China and South Korea 
have with Japan, a headline in the 21 August 1983 People’s Daily, the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) official newspaper, which read, “The Past, If not Forgotten, Is 
a Guide for the Future,” reveals much about the Chinese perspective on history, but 
contrasts starkly with George Santayana’s aphorism that “those who cannot remember 
the past are condemned to repeat it.”1  In the context of lingering historical animosity 
against Japan, such disparity may reflect Chinese and, presumably, Korean desires for 
Japan to forget its wartime past by discontinuing honoring imperialistic memories. For 
the Chinese and Koreans, they remember the past all too well. As a consequence they 
violate their own dictum of forgetting the past in favor of keeping historical animosity 
against Japan alive to ensure Japan remembers its imperialistic past thus preventing a 
return to militarism—the Japanese charge that the Chinese and Koreans manufacture 
historical issues for political purposes. While the Chinese and Koreans wish to forget the 
past, Japanese provocative actions that harken back to unsettled historical grievances 
serve as a reminder that Japan has not forgotten its wartime past. Rather, certain Japanese 
provocative actions suggest that Tokyo adopts Santayana’s perspective: remembering its 
militaristic past helps ensure its pacifist future.  
One of the ways Japan antagonizes its neighbors is when the Japanese prime 
minister pays tribute to Japanese war dead through ceremonial worship at the Yasukuni 
Shrine in Tokyo—an event that Chinese and Koreans criticize as honoring Japanese 
imperialism. When Japanese prime ministers visit Yasukuni, they elicit responses from 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) that are widely 
known. What is less understood is what these responses can reveal about the starkly 
different political systems these two countries employ. The major research question this 
study explores is: How do different political systems in the People’s Republic of China 
                                                 
1 Nihon Keizai Shimbun in Japanese, September 8, 1983, in United States Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, Daily Report: Asia and Pacific (Washington, DC: GPO) (hereafter referred to as FBIS 
Asia) September 15, 1983, 3; George Santayana, The Life of Reason (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1998), 
82. 
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and the Republic of Korea affect each central government’s response to a historically 
significant event, in this case Japanese prime minister visits to Yasukuni?  Additionally, 
how do their political systems affect the manner these responses are implemented? What 
impact, if any, does the political system have on governmental support or repression of 
anti-Japanese nationalism?  This thesis seeks to address these questions.   
Since 1951 (the year that Japan entered into a peace treaty with the Allied 
powers), Japanese prime ministers have visited the Yasukuni Shrine 64 times. Given the 
differences in the manner that democratic and authoritarian regimes respond to public 
opinion, observers may expect the two systems to respond differently to Yasukuni, but 
the study finds that they do not. The argument advanced in this thesis is that with respect 
to Yasukuni, the overwhelming majority (90 percent) of responses from Beijing and 
Seoul were similar (in that both either ignored the visits or protested them), thus 
demonstrating that the difference in political system had little impact on the approaches 
both governments took to these visits. Economic status, rather, played a greater role in 
governmental response to Yasukuni. While political systems may not have shaped the 
responses, they were important in the way each government responded to public opinion. 
Lastly, when either government objected to official visits to Yasukuni, the evidence 
reveals that the underlying motivation for both governments was and remains the same: 
To prevent a resurgence of Japanese militarism. 
A. IMPORTANCE 
Japan is plagued by the memory of 20th century atrocities it committed in China 
and Korea. In the decades since World War II, Japan emerged as a global economic 
power relative to the PRC and the ROK. During Japan’s rise, the Japanese government 
attempted to atone for its wartime past by apologizing for its imperialism and by 
normalizing relationships with its neighbors, the ROK in 1965 and the PRC in 1978.2  
Despite Japan’s successful establishment of diplomatic relations with both countries and 
                                                 
2 Japan’s first recorded postwar apology was in 1965 by Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusabruo 
at the conclusion of the normalization treaty in Seoul. According to Wakamiya Yoshibumi, Shiina stated, 
“We feel great regret and deep remorse over the unhappy phase in the long history of relations between the 
two countries.” Quote from Wakamiya Yoshibumi, “‘The Law of Next Year’ in Japan’s Politics” The Asia-
Pacific Journal: Japan Focus (2006), last accessed March 4, 2013, www.japanfocus.org. 
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its postwar economic success, neither country has forgotten nor forgiven Japan for its 
imperialist past. This historical animosity often provokes anger in the news and discolors 
bilateral relationships between Japan and its neighbors. One event that serves as a highly 
controversial link between past and present is Japanese prime minister visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine. The conventional wisdom on Yasukuni posits that up to 1985, Japanese 
prime ministers visited the shrine without incident.3  Since then, Japanese officials’ visits 
to Yasukuni have become highly politicized and are perceived as a symbol of an 
unrepentant Japan honoring its militaristic past. Yet what is overlooked in the 
nationalistic reactions these visits trigger in the PRC and the ROK is that the two 
countries have completely different political systems. 
The current perspective on Chinese and South Korean government responses to 
Japanese provocations suggests that these governments support popular anti-Japanese 
movements when it suits their interests and repress them for the same reason. What is 
needed is a comparison between each government’s response to a significant Japanese 
action that has historically proven controversial in generating popular anti-Japanese 
nationalism among both audiences. Japanese prime minister visits to the Yasukuni Shrine 
since 14 class-A war criminals were interred there in 1978 have typically provoked such 
nationalistic emotions, and therefore they serve as an appropriate occasion to observe 
Chinese and South Korean governmental responses. Chinese and Koreans consistently 
protest official visits to the shrine, affording the opportunity to assess each government’s 
response to each visit. 
Moreover, it is appropriate to assess the prevailing status of bilateral relations of 
China and South Korea with Japan. If these governments act in a similar fashion—
supporting or repressing anti-Japanese movements according to their needs—then the 
revelation that an authoritarian and a democratic regime respond similarly to the same 
provocation would contribute significantly to the understanding of Chinese and South 
                                                 
3 Evidence proves that China objected to state sponsorship of Yasukuni as early as 1969, and the 
People’s Daily lodged its first official criticism of the Japanese prime minister in 1983, thus discrediting the 
claim that Yasukuni became an international flashpoint in 1985. See Peking NCNA in English, April 16, 
1974, in FBIS Asia, April 17, 1974, A14; Nihon Keizai Shimbun in Japanese, September 8, 1983, in FBIS 
Asia, September 15, 1983, 3. 
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Korean bilateral relations with Japan. Such analysis may also reveal when each 
government is more likely to respond in a negative way to Yasukuni Shrine visits, which 
may aid in assessing Tokyo’s calibration of national policy on official visits to the shrine.  
While this thesis addresses visits to the Yasukuni Shrine as the focus of its 
analysis, the importance of its findings may have far-reaching potential beyond the 
shrine. The real inquiry is not about reaction to visits to the Yasukuni Shrine per se, but 
rather on the response the visits elicit in an authoritarian regime versus a democratic one. 
Findings that reveal similarities or differences in the types of governmental responses or 
the frequency thereof could be applied to other areas of historical friction between Japan 
and its northeast Asian neighbors: the Nanjing atrocity, the comfort women, Japanese 
history textbooks, etc.  
Unresolved historical grievances seem to be a major contributor to the suboptimal 
relationships between Japan and its neighbors. Improving the situation—not just between 
the three countries involved but in the entire region—requires all involved to get past 
history. A small but important step towards that goal is figuring out how, when, and why 
historical issues are kept alive. 
B. THE LITERATURE 
The existing literature on Chinese and South Korean government response to 
Japanese prime minister visits to the Yasukuni Shrine focuses mostly on the Chinese 
response from 1985 onward and, to a much lesser degree, the South Korean response 
from 2001 onward. Very little attention has focused on South Korean government 
reactions to shrine visits, and the little that has done so is thin regarding how, when, and 
why the ROK government responds to the Yasukuni visits. None of the literature 
surveyed in this review compares intergovernmental responses to Japanese prime 
minister visits to the shrine in China and South Korea. 
The following review focuses on what academic and policy authors have to say 
about Chinese and Korea anti-Japanese nationalism vis-à-vis Yasukuni. The survey 
focuses on China, then South Korea, and lastly Japan.   
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1. China 
In China Eyes Japan, Allen Whiting argues that perceptions and misperceptions 
of Japanese foreign and domestic policy are the cause of Sino-Japanese tension. He 
concludes that political issues outweigh economic cooperation between the two and that 
the prospect for improved bilateral relations depends largely on the signals that Tokyo 
sends to Beijing. Among the political problems that divide the two countries, the 
Yasukuni Shrine visits stand at the forefront. Whiting argues that visits by any Japanese 
official are likely to arouse anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese. He highlights 
Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 
August 1985 as the event that occasioned mass anti-Japanese student protests in Beijing. 
These protests threatened to undermine Beijing’s hopes for Japanese assistance in 
Chinese economic modernization initiatives, namely through CCP General Secretary Hu 
Yaobang’s formation of a Commission for Sino-Japanese Friendship in the Twenty-first 
Century. 
Whiting notes that Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko’s Yasukuni visit in 
1982 did not inspire national outrage because it was not made in an official capacity. 
However, such a conclusion presumes that everyone can and will distinguish an official 
visit from an unofficial visit each time. Can a head of state ever separate himself from his 
status?  Moreover, multiple media sources in Beijing and Tokyo indicate that Suzuki’s 
visit was in fact done in an official capacity, thus calling Whiting’s assertion into 
question.4  Whiting’s work was published in 1989, so further analysis of shrine visits 
beyond 1987 are required to test his assumptions. 
What Whiting’s research lacks is an adequate analysis of why Beijing repressed 
popular protests in 1985. He makes a clear distinction between the response from Chinese 
society and the regime: politically charged events such as visits to the Yasukuni Shrine 
will continue to aggravate Sino-Japanese relations at the mass level regardless of whether 
the regime protests it or not. If Whiting’s assertion is true, then with regard to the 
regime’s role in leading or following public opinion, three possibilities emerge: (1) the 
                                                 
4 See “Japan Holds Memorial Service” in Xinhua, (15 August 1982) and Asahi Shimbun (16 August 
1982) article. 
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protests are popular and not supported by Beijing, and so suppressed; (2) popular protests 
are provoked or stimulated by Beijing; or (3) the protests are popular in origin but are 
supported or manipulated by Beijing. Based on Whiting’s evidence, the relationship 
between leading and following is not clear.5   
Lastly, one could build upon Whiting’s work by analyzing the impact of a 
country’s political system in response to perceived manifestations of rising Japanese 
nationalism, such as visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. According to Whiting, “The basic 
obstacle to better Sino-Japanese relations lies in the gap between an authoritarian system 
that grants party and government a directing role over all public aspects of society and a 
pluralistic, democratic system in which public diversity within both government and 
society is necessary and proper.”6  What happens when Whiting’s assertion is applied to 
a democratic country instead of an authoritarian one?  If the ROK, which has had a 
democratic government since the late 1980s, responds in a fashion similar to its 
authoritarian counterpart, what does that reveal about Whiting’s conclusion that the key 
factor towards resolving historical animosities in Northeast Asia is the political system? 
In China’s New Nationalism, Peter Gries argues that Beijing has demonstrated 
that it will either support or repress anti-Japanese social movements depending on its 
interests at the time, particularly with regard to matters of international prestige. A key 
issue Gries addresses regarding anti-Japanese social movements is the difference in East 
and West understandings of Chinese nationalism: Chinese analysts view Chinese 
nationalism as a bottom-up movement, whereas Western analysts view it as a top-down 
propaganda tool of the CCP; though it could also be a combination of both.7 Gries’s 
dichotomy of interpretation moves beyond Whiting’s analysis and submits that Chinese 
society will view provocative Japanese actions as antagonistic and revisionist at heart, 
and the people will respond regardless of whether the Party responds or not.   
                                                 
5 Allen Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 197. 
6 Ibid., 185. 
7 Peter Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2004), 119. 
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Gries’s work is helpful in understanding the Chinese approach to Chinese 
nationalism. But his work does not discuss controversy in China over official visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine. How Beijing has reacted to Japanese prime minister visits and the 
implications of its reaction may reveal regime intentions. 
In China: Fragile Superpower, Susan Shirk argues that China is a “brittle, 
authoritarian regime that fears its own citizens and can only bend so far to accommodate 
the demands of foreign governments.”8  She contends that the regime’s worst fear is a 
“national protest movement of discontented groups . . . united against the regime by the 
shared fervor of nationalism.9  If Shirk is correct, then her argument supports the 
theoretical point of departure that Chinese nationalism is a bottom-up movement to which 
the CCP responds. 
Shirk discusses some of the actions that the regime took in with respect to anti-
Japanese protests in 2005. The People’s Police and the People’s Armed Police supported 
student protests in 2005 in Beijing, but only up to a point. They prevented the violence 
from escalating to an unmanageable level. Further illustrative of the regime’s 
management of protests, the CCP Propaganda Department imposed a media blackout 
leading up to the protests. These crowd and information control measures illustrate some 
of the techniques the regime uses to allow its citizens to direct their anger outward, rather 
than inward, without losing control of the situation. 
Regarding interests that drive the CCP to tolerate such protests, Shirk highlights 
Yinan He’s observation that China learned a lesson from South Korean democratization. 
According to Shirk, “In South Korea during the 1960s, public protests against what 
people viewed as the weak stance of the country’s dictatorial leaders in dealing with 
Japan fueled the movement toward democracy—the same thing could happen in 
China.”10  Not only does Shirk’s assertion reveal why Beijing might tolerate nationalist 
                                                 
8 Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5. 
9 Ibid., 7. 
10 Ibid., 145. 
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social movements, it also provides some insight into the ROK government’s experience 
of satisfying nationalistic demands in the 1960s. 
Lastly, Shirk describes that the extent of Chinese frustrations with the Japanese 
government extended beyond prime minister visits to the shrine. A 2005 speech by PRC 
Ambassador to Tokyo Wang Yi stated that Beijing desired not only that the Japanese 
prime minister stop visiting the shrine, but also his top administration officials—the chief 
cabinet secretary and the foreign minister.11  Wang’s recitation of Chinese demands may 
be transferable to Koreans’. 
In Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan 
Policy, James Reilly contends that, contrary to Susan Shirk’s thesis, China is not a fragile 
state fearful of its own society. It is rather a flexible regime that implements a strategy of 
“tolerance, responsiveness, persuasion, and repression” in response to “the rise of public 
opinion in Chinese foreign policy.”12  Central to Reilly’s argument is that Chinese public 
opinion matters. According to Reilly, Chinese public opinion by the early 2000s was 
largely distrustful of and hostile towards Japan, creating limits on Beijing’s Japan policy. 
Reilly’s argument rests largely on two pillars: (1) political opportunities; and (2) Chinese 
control over the media. 
Reilly uses Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2001 and 
2002 to illustrate how political fragmentation creates opportunities for public 
mobilization.13  He cites the transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao in 2002–03 as an 
instance of state-society interaction during which party leaders sought to improve Japan 
relations at the peak of a Yasukuni flare up. In this context, Beijing’s Japan policy played 
out in a context of divisions among political elite and tensions in bilateral relations, 
which together provided opportunity and incentive for public opinion to influence foreign 
policy.14 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 163. 
12 James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 220. 
13 See Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
14 Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State, 214. 
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Reilly’s argument that Beijing possesses a capacity to respond flexibly and to 
adapt quickly to public opinion rests largely on its ability to control the media. If the 
regime controls the information that the public receives, then it can persuade society to 
move in the direction it desires. Through this mechanism the regime can manipulate anti-
Japanese protests, knowing that it can turn the nationalistic tide in the opposite direction 
when needed. Reilly’s theory comports with Whiting’s notion that authoritarian regimes 
enjoy control over society, which is a fundamental difference from a democratic regime. 
It also matches Shirk’s assertion that “the CCP will do whatever it takes to make sure that 
the information reaching the public through the commercial media and the Internet does 
not inspire people to challenge party rule.”15   
2. The Republic of Korea 
How then does a democratic nation like South Korea manage public opinion 
about Japan and its provocative actions?  In his article, “South Korea in 2001: Frustration 
and Continuing Uncertainty,” Ha Chool-yong assesses the state of Korean-Japan relations 
in 2001, just before Koizumi announced a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. He describes the 
Korean media backlash against Koizumi, but the details he offers are limited. More 
importantly, Ha’s article links the shrine to another historical friction point: textbooks. In 
this context one might conclude that the Koreans only voiced discontent with the shrine 
out of the opportunity to pile on to the issue of the Japanese whitewashing history in 
school textbooks. 
Moon Chung-in and Suh Seung-won argue that a Northeast Asia security 
dilemma is caused by “national identity and the politics of nationalism, which are closely 
intertwined with collective memory of history.”16  With regard to the ROK, Moon and 
Suh claim that assertive nationalist sentiments cause Koreans to be suspicious and 
distrustful of Japan in a way that economic interdependence cannot ameliorate. Prime 
                                                 
15 Susan Shirk, “Changing Media, Changing China,” in Changing Media, Changing China, ed. Susan 
Shirk (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3. 
16 Chung-in Moon and Seung-Won Suh, “Identity Politics, Nationalism, and the Future of Northeast 
Asian Order,” in The United States and Northeast Asia, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 194. 
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Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine stand as only one of several Japanese 
provocations offending Korean nationalism that impedes Seoul-Tokyo ties, despite 
relationship-building initiatives such as the 1998 Joint Declaration on Future Partnership 
and the 2002 joint hosting of the World Cup. While most would agree that Koizumi’s 
visits did damage bilateral relations, Moon and Suh do not analyze why Korean 
nationalism was piqued in 2001, but not at any other time. The implication is either that 
previous Japanese prime minister visits did not provoke Korean nationalism, or that it did 
but not to a degree worth mentioning. Either way there is a gap in the information. Moon 
and Suh present plausible reasons why the ROK government did not propagate anti-
Japanese sentiment in the late 1990s; however, such an inference merits further 
investigation. 
Moon and Suh provide interesting statistical analysis of Korean and Chinese 
perceptions of Japan. Based on the results of a regional cooperation survey, they found 
that 90 percent of South Korean respondents and 87 percent of Chinese respondents 
viewed history as “a major impediment to regionalism” and that among those the 
majority of South Koreans believed historical issues were insoluble.17  While these data 
are useful in establishing a potential baseline of where South Koreans or Chinese stand 
on historical issues with Japan, they seem inconsistent with past behavior. If history is so 
important to these audiences, then why were previous Japanese prime minister visits to 
the Yasukuni Shrine ignored? 
Moon and Suh discuss the differences between the Kim Dae-jung administration 
and that of Roh Moo-hyun. Kim seemed more inclined to strengthen bilateral relations 
with Japan whereas Roh took a more adversarial position. Interestingly, Japanese prime 
ministers visited Yasukuni under both administrations, so what explains the divergent 
outcomes?  One hypothesis is that the media of 2002 may have been more robust in terms 
of speed of reporting and enjoyed wider audiences than in 1998, which might explain 
why media sensationalizing of Yasukuni was greater in 2002 as compared to 1998. 
Another approach may be to focus on any major domestic policy initiatives over time and 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 213. 
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their economic precedence over historical animosity. For example, did the East Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997–98 play any role in Kim Dae-jung’s calculus on whether to work 
with Japan for much needed economic support versus fighting with Japan over Yasukuni? 
In Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension, Lee Chong-sik provides an in-
depth analysis of the political interactions between the governments of Japan and South 
Korea from 1960 to 1985. He explores many of the highs and lows in the bilateral 
relationship, the domestic and international factors that influenced it, and the overall 
direction that each government sought to pursue vis-à-vis the other. Lee’s work provides 
perspectives that one can use to link Japanese and Korean policy initiatives together with 
known dates of Japanese prime minister visits to the shrine to infer what might have been 
the motivation or rationale on the part of the ROK government to ignore visits to the 
shrine. 
3. Japan 
Richard Samuels, a prominent American specialist on Japan, offers a helpful 
account of the Yasukuni Shrine from the Japanese perspective. According to Samuels, 
“Virtually every postwar prime minister, regardless of political orientation, visited 
Yasukuni while in office, including the mainstream Yoshida Shigeru (ten times) and the 
anti-mainstream Nakasone Yasuhiro (eleven times).”18  He notes that in 1978 priests 
secretly interred 14 Class A war criminals, making Yasukuni a “lightening rod for 
historical memory.”19  His data show that the majority of Chinese (60 percent) view the 
shrine as a symbol of militarism. Samuels claims that Yasukuni serves as a “barometer of 
one’s view of the colonial experiences of China and Korea and, by implication, of history 
and politics more generally.”20 
Samuels highlights the significance of Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone’s 15 
August 1985 visit to the shrine as historically significant because it was the first visit of a 
prime minister after the shrine’s politicization resulting from the enshrined war criminals. 
                                                 




However, Prime Ministers Fukuda Takeo, Ohira Masayoshi, and Suzuki Zenko each 
visited Yasukuni after the 17 October 1978 interment of the Class A war criminals, which 
lessens the validity of the popular argument that Nakasone’s 15 August 1985 visit was of 
the magnitude for which it is now credited. Such an inconsistency in the data may reflect 
the relatively low key Chinese response observed in 1982 and 1983 as compared to 1985, 
but further begs the question of why the governments in China and South Korea chose to 
make an issue of one but ignore the others. Upon answering that question, one could take 
the inquiry one step further and analyze what specific actions the governments 
implemented in 1985 that they did not implement in earlier years. Answering both of 
these questions would greatly contribute to the existing body of knowledge on when, 
why, and how these governments elect to promote animosity towards Japan. Samuels 
goes on to say, “They [Japan’s new mainstream conservatives] point out that between 
1978, when the fourteen Class A war criminals were enshrined, and 1984, Japanese prime 
ministers visited Yasukuni twenty times without any objection from Beijing. This, they 
insist, is evidence that Beijing has manufactured the Yasukuni problem for its own 
political purposes.”21 
Claiming that Beijing uses anti-Japanese sentiment—whether aroused by 
Yasukuni Shrine visits, textbook revisions, or offensive public statements diminishing 
Japanese culpability at Nanjing—is in keeping with Greis’s thesis that Beijing supports 
and represses anti-Japanese social movements as it suits its interests, particularly in 
gaining and maintaining face. What is missing from this theory is analysis of the 
domestic and international context in which the regime supports or represses these 
movements, and the Korean angle is almost completely ignored in these works. 
Shibuichi Daiki argues that of all the visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, Prime 
Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s in 1985 and Koizumi Junichiro’s in 2001 were the most 
significant in terms of triggering animosity in China and South Korea because these visits 
were official in the sense that the visit was announced as such or the Japanese 
government paid the entrance fee to the shrine. According to Shibuichi, prior to 1985 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 125. 
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visiting the shrine was normal and did not cause international outrage, which begs the 
question of what happened in 1985 that politicized the issue?  Shibuichi merely identifies 
Nakasone’s visit as sparking the flames of international controversy with China, but he 
does not explore the issue of why the Chinese took such issue with the visit (Shibuichi 
even points out that the Chinese largely ignored the 1979, 1980, and 1981 visits). The 
1985 visit was met with harsh criticism by Beijing, which was then followed by mass 
Chinese protests months later. This is an interesting angle on China’s side of the 
argument. Whiting and Gries would argue that the norm is for Chinese citizens to take 
issue with shrine visits and that the regime responded to public opinion according to its 
interests. Yet here we see the regime taking the lead and the people following. 
Shibuichi attempted to analyze the South Korean reaction to the shrine visits as 
well. His argument is that the Korean reactions are similar to how the Chinese “see the 
shrine as honoring Japanese militarism and by extension the Nanjing massacre,” 
Yasukuni honors the oppressive Japanese rule to Koreans, and therefore merits outrage.22  
According to Shibuichi, “The Seoul government applies pressure in much the same way 
that China does, except that Korea does not have a party- or state-owned media through 
which to express official opinions. However, the Korean mass media have excoriated 
Japan and many public demonstrations against Japan have been staged.”23  Shibuichi 
notes that Seoul only registered its objection to Yasukuni during Koizumi’s visits starting 
in 2001. Shibuichi admits, “Why Korea waited until 2001 to join China in opposing and 
protesting a Japanese prime minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine is an intriguing 
question but outside the scope of this article.”24 Clearly the Korean angle on this issue 
has been largely ignored and merits research and analysis. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
To discover why the preponderance of PRC and ROK responses to Japanese 
prime minister visits to Yasukuni were similar, a historical study and comparative 
                                                 
22 Daiki Shibuichi, “The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan: Why All the 
Fuss?” Asian Survey 45, no. 2 (2005): 213. 
23 Ibid., 205. 
24 Ibid., 211. 
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methodology of Chinese and South Korean governmental reactions was used. 
Information was gathered on the shrine and all prime minister visits since the signing of 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. Once the data set was built, source documents 
were researched to gauge the response from both the PRC and the ROK.25  In cases 
where no observable response could be proven, a non-response was attributed to that 
government, implying that the event was either ignored or did not hold enough 
significance to take any observable action. In these cases where visits were ignored, 
research was conducted to determine the state of Chinese and South Korean bilateral 
relations with Japan to assess if any economic or other initiatives could help explain why 
these governments would ignore what each viewed as a provocative event. 
Observed PRC and ROK governmental responses fell into two primary 
categories— similar and different—with a secondary subset of either ignoring the visit or 
lodging official protest. A “similar” response indicates that both governments either 
ignored or protested the visit; conversely, while a “different” response would normally 
indicate that one government protested while the other ignored, the evidence suggests 
that there was never an instance that the ROK protested but the PRC ignored. Thus, a 
different response indicates that the PRC protested while the ROK ignored a given visit. 
Noting when these two governments behaved similarly or differently is an important 
conclusion for its own sake, but an equally helpful finding is not just the consistency of 
the response but knowing when each government ignored or protested visits. A 
combination of the findings of consistency of response and also type of response hold the 
potential to advance understanding of when and why these governments are most likely 
to raise objections over this recurring event of historical symbolism. 
                                                 
25 Primary source documents, including official press statements, communiqués, and government 
documents, were used to establish each government’s position on visits to the shrine, or in relation to Japan 
more broadly. Secondary sources—including scholarly books on Chinese and Korean nationalism, 
academic or regional journals, and news media—were used to gather information on visits to the shrine and 
the reactions to them. The thesis used the Foreign Broadcast Information Service’s Daily Report series (up 
to 1996) and the Open Source Center database (1996 to present) in an effort to include translated Chinese, 
Korean, and Japanese primary source documents, press reports, and opinion pieces. Each of these measures 
was considered across time to establish consistencies or differences between political parties in all three 
countries. 
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Once the information on the visits was gathered, the thesis assessed the general 
reaction to each in the PRC and ROK. How did the governments respond?  How did 
society in general respond?  If the response differed between government and society, 
what might account for that difference?  What was the status of bilateral relations 
between the PRC and ROK with Japan?  What policy initiatives were being pursued that 
might influence government support or repression of public protests?  Were these 
initiatives agreed to by all, or were there dissenters in the government; if so, did the 
opposition promote a different public response than what was endorsed by the majority?  
Lastly, what similarities and/or differences exist in the way China responded to the visits 
and how South Korea did?  What trends or patterns emerge? 
Lastly, a note on naming convention: throughout this thesis all efforts were made 
to transcribe Japanese names with the surname listed first, which is common practice in 
East Asia. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The study begins by putting the Yasukuni controversy in its historical context. A 
brief introduction to the Yasukuni Shrine and the Japanese prime ministers who have 
visited while serving in that capacity since 1951 provides readers with an appreciation of 
why the Chinese and Koreans take issue with a Japanese cemetery (those unfamiliar with 
the Shinto faith may not draw a distinction between a cemetery and a shrine). Moreover, 
understanding the politicization of the shrine is crucial to understanding Chinese and 
Korean nationalism the controversy evokes today. 
Next, the thesis defines political systems and state leadership in the PRC and in 
the ROK. The PRC, an authoritarian regime since its founding, enjoys certain freedom of 
action uncommon in representative governments. The Korean case is useful as the 
Republic began authoritarian, but then democratized in the late 1980s. The leadership of 
each government is discussed as it has direct consequence on the observable behavior 
with regard to Japanese provocations.  
The thesis then moves into the historical study of Japanese prime minister visits to 
the shrine. The analysis begins with China and then moves to South Korea. Each country 
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study attempted to examine sufficiently the aforementioned questions before moving on. 
Each country’s historical study concludes with the author’s observations as to how the 
central government responded to each visit in comparison to its policy initiatives, both 
domestic and international. 
Following the historical study, the thesis compared the two countries, China and 
South Korea, and discusses the similarities and differences that were observed, and what 
these findings reveal about the significance a country’s political system has on 
nationalism in relation to an event of historical significance. 
The study closes with the author’s conclusions on Chinese and South Korean 




II. SHINTO AND YASUKUNI 
A. SHINTO 
To understand Yasukuni and the controversy surrounding it, one needs a basic 
understanding of the Shinto faith. Shinto is the indigenous religion of the Japanese. 
According to Dr. Sokyo Ono, while the religion is one of the oldest in the world, the 
earliest record of the word “Shinto” was found in the Nihon Shoki (“Chronicles of 
Japan”), compiled in the early eighth century.26  Ono emphasizes how Shinto is more 
than just a religion—it is a way of life: “It is an amalgam of attitudes, ideas, and ways of 
doing things that through two milleniums [sic] and more have become an integral part of 
the way of the Japanese people.”27 
Shinto is uniquely different from Western religions. First and foremost, Shinto 
has no central religious figure or religious text, making it unique amongst many 
organized religions, but difficult for non-Japanese to understand. The core of the Shinto 
faith is the worship of “kami,” which can best be translated into “spirit.”  The Japanese 
who worship kami typically do so at Shinto shrines, either privately in their homes or 
publicly at local or national shrines. Unlike Western religions, Shinto worship is not 
conducted in mass gatherings, but rather individually and consists of four simple 
elements: purification, offerings, prayer, and a symbolic feast. Honoring one’s ancestry 
makes Shintoism intensely personal and reflects the distinctive Japanese culture of 
worshiping kami through deliberate acts of religious ritual.  
What exactly are kami?  According to Dr. Ono, among kami are “the qualities of 
growth, fertility, and production; natural phenomena, such as wind and thunder; natural 
objects, such as the sun, mountains, rivers, trees and rocks; some animals; and ancestral 
spirits.”28  It is the last category that is of particular importance to this study: the spirits of 
national heroes and those who gave their lives in service defending Japan. 
                                                 
26 Ono Sokyo, Shinto: The Kami Way (Rutland: Tuttle Publishing, 1962), 2. 
27 Ibid., 3. 
28 Ibid., 7. 
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B. YASUKUNI 
1. History of the Shrine 
Prior to the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Tokugawa Shogunate essentially ruled 
Japan.29 The Tokugawa Shogunate (1603–1868) successfully ended the warring states 
period (sengoku era, 1467–1603), quelled large-scale violence, and created stable and 
effective bureaucratic institutions.30  However, the Western “opening” of Japan—in 1853 
at the hands of Commodore Matthew Perry—critically damaged the Tokugawa regime’s 
prestige and perceived efficacy.31  Western influence altered the social dynamic in Japan, 
which, in combination with the widely accepted domestic dissatisfaction with the 
shogunate’s ability to protect Japan from outside encroachment, led factions to challenge 
the shogun in favor of restoring supreme Japanese rule to the emperor. Those who sought 
to overthrow Tokugawa, primarily from the Satsuma and Choshu feudal domains, rose in 
numbers and resolve and waged war against Tokugawa, culminating in the Boshin Civil 
War (1867–69). In the face of mounting opposition, Tokugawa Yoshinobu—the last 
shogun—abdicated political power to Emperor Meiji. Those who died for political 
reformation from the national crisis in 1853 through the Boshin Civil War provided the 
impetus for Emperor Meiji to erect a shrine in honor of their sacrifice.32 
Originally constructed as Shokonsho in 1869 by order of Emperor Meiji, the 
shrine was renamed in 1879 to reflect its present day title: Yasukuni. At Yasukuni, the 
souls of over 2.4 million kami are enshrined. Often compared to Western national 
cemeteries, Yasukuni is the place where Japan’s war dead are remembered. Different 
from a cemetery, though, no remains of the honored reside at Yasukuni—only the spirit 
of the kami. In fact, the only tangible remains of any of the enshrined are name cards, 
                                                 
29 The term “shogunate” refers to the ruling elite in Japan whereby the shogun—the military general 
whom the emperor charged with maintaining order throughout the realm—dominated all aspects of 
political, social, economic, and military affairs in Japan. See James McClain, Japan: A Modern History 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 5. 
30 McClain, Japan, 17–18. 
31 On 31 March 1854, Commodore Perry and shogunal representatives concluded the Treaty of Peace 
and Amity between the U.S. and Japan, which ended Japan’s seclusion policy and lead to broader outside 
intrusion by Russia, France, and Britain with similar unequal treaties in 1856. See McClain, Japan, 138. 
32 In this context, Yasukuni has a dual purpose: (1) a Shinto shrine to worship kami, and (2) to honor 
those who died wresting power from the shogunate to restore it to the emperor. 
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which distorts the popular Western analogy that the Yasukuni Shrine is Japan’s version 
of Arlington National Cemetery. The part of the analogy that does hold true is that, much 
like Arlington, Yasukuni is a place where Japanese can go to remember and honor those 
who died in service to their country. 
2. Enshrinement 
The manner in which souls are interred merits a brief discussion. According to 
Ono, “the oldest and most prevalent type of the kami-faith is Shrine Shinto,” which 
focuses on a nationalized shrine system.33  Shrines are served and presided over by 
priests. The Meiji Restoration saw the convergence of the institutions of church and state; 
priests became state officials and shrines became state institutions.34  In the immediate 
postwar order, however, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), 
General Douglas MacArthur, abolished state “sponsorship, support, perpetuation” and 
“financial support from public funds” of Shintoism with his 15 December 1945 “Shinto 
Directive.”35  Following the disestablishment of state-sponsored Shinto, priests lost their 
official government status; however, the chief priests of post-1945 Shinto shrines were 
still responsible for interment activities, with respect to who is interred and when.36  
As a final note on interment, once the chief priest enshrines a soul, that soul 
forever joins the kami and can never be separated. While a physical name card may be 
                                                 
33 Ono, Shinto, 14. 
34 Ibid., 15, 41; The 1889 Japanese Constitution, which was bestowed upon the Japanese by Emperor 
Meiji, gave absolute power to the emperor. A popular contemporary argument (see William Sturgeon’s 
Japan’s Yasukuni Shrine: Place of Peace or Place of Conflict, page 38) is that the 1889 constitution made 
the emperor the head Shinto priest. However, no such language is explicitly stated in the constitution. Since 
the constitution endows the emperor with near absolute power, one might presume that the emperor could 
be the head priest, but such a conclusion is not supported by the document. 
35 The directive served as a point of departure for the much broader freedom of religion article found 
in the 1946 Japanese constitution. See “The Shinto Directive,” In Contemporary Religions in Japan 1, no. 2 
(1960): 85.  
36 Chief priests can only enshrine souls that can be named. Unidentifiable remains of those who died 
in service to Japan cannot be enshrined at Yasukuni. According to William Sturgeon, the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare (MHW) provides basic information (name, date and place of birth, and circumstances 
of death) on those considered for enshrinement to the chief priests. Thus the chief priests make the final 
determination on enshrinement, but the MHW determines who qualifies as war dead. See William 
Sturgeon, Japan’s Yasukuni Shrine: Place of Peace or Place of Conflict? (Boca Raton: Dissertation.com, 
2006), 66–67. 
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easily removed, the spirits of those venerated souls become intertwined in a non-physical 
plane and will remain as such forever. 
3. Politicization of Yasukuni 
To understand why Yasukuni elicits the reactions it does among international 
audiences requires an appreciation of the finer points of the Yasukuni controversy. What 
is it about Yasukuni that so alarms Chinese and Koreans in ways absent other Shinto 
shrines?  And has it always been this way?  To answer these questions one must look 
beyond Yasukuni’s dual purpose and explore the history of Yasukuni in regards to three 
politically charged issues: (1) Japanese prime minister visits to the shrine, (2) the capacity 
of those visits (official or private), and (3) the enshrinement of fourteen Class-A war 
criminals. 
a. Prime Minister Visits to Yasukuni 
Even in postwar Japan, Yasukuni continued to thrive under its dual 
purpose of Shinto shrine and national war memorial, enshrining over two million from 
the Greater East Asian War (World War II).37  Additionally, up through the early 1980s, 
it was commonplace for Japanese prime ministers to visit Yasukuni and pay tribute to 
their ancestors without causing diplomatic crises. Only after 1983 were these visits met 
with international outrage. 
Since the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Allied powers in 
1951, Japanese prime ministers visited the Yasukuni Shrine 64 times (see Table 1). The 
majority of these visits (67 percent) occurred in conjunction with the annual spring and 
autumn festivals at Yasukuni; ten visits occurred in mid-August commemorations of the 
end of the Pacific War (the first of which occurred in 1975) and eleven visits occurred 
outside of either the festivals or August.38  While this study presents findings and 
analysis on the visits writ large in later chapters, it is worth taking note now of two 
Japanese prime ministerial friction points in the Yasukuni chronology that most modern 
                                                 
37 Sturgeon, Japan’s Yasukuni Shrine, 64. 
38 The annual spring and autumn festivals hold special significance to the Japanese. Prior to 1978, the 
Emperor of Japan, or his delegate, regularly attended these festivals. 
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scholarship focuses on: Prime Minster Nakasone Yasuhiro’s 1985 visit and Prime 
Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s 2001 visit. 
 
 
Table 1.   Japanese Prime Minister Visits to Yasukuni (1951–2013)  
(From Sturgeon, 2006) 
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Until 1983, the international community—notably China and South 
Korea—largely ignored Japanese prime minister visits to Yasukuni. Japanese Prime 
Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro broke that pattern when he visited on 15 August 1983 to 
commemorate 38th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War, prompting China to 
respond. Interestingly though, modern scholarship on the Yasukuni controversy credits 
Nakasone’s 15 August 1985 visit as the event that first introduced international notoriety 
on the controversy. However, three issues of the People’s Daily (16, 19, and 21 August 
1983) detailing Beijing’s official objection to Nakasone’s 1983 visit discredit this 
conventional wisdom. Why the 1983 visit suddenly elicited such a response in ways 
previous visits did not remains unclear. What is clear is that, despite the August 1983 
protest, Beijing’s response to future Japanese prime minister visits was not consistent—
neither in regards to future mid-August visits, nor to the visits more broadly.  (The details 
of these inconsistencies are discussed later in the study.)  While Nakasone’s 1985 visit 
received intense Chinese criticism (such that it would be eleven years before another 
Japanese prime minister would visit), it was not the first time that Beijing responded. 
In 2001, Koizumi Junichiro became the Japanese prime minister. Upon 
election to office, Koizumi pledged to visit Yasukuni on 15 August to honor those who 
died in service to Japan, thus wasting no time gaining Beijing and Seoul’s attention. 
Koizumi visited Yasukuni as promised, though on the 13th rather than the 15th.39  The 
visit marked the first time a Japanese prime minister visited Yasukuni in mid-August 
since Nakasone’s last visit in 1985, and the visit set a precedence for Sino-Japanese 
relations for the whole of Koizumi’s term. Despite repeated official objections from both 
Seoul and Beijing, Koizumi proceeded with annual visits to Yasukuni. Koizumi tried to 
mitigate the international tension these visits created by offsetting the timing of his 2003 
and 2004 visits to January, but his efforts had little effect. The six visits during Koizumi’s 
                                                 
39 In an attempt to manage the inflammatory situation Koizumi’s pledge created, Beijing secretly 
negotiated with Tokyo prior to August 2001 and both sides agreed that Koizumi would visit Yasukuni, but 
only after the sensitive World War II anniversary had passed. Koizumi, likely in an effort to appease 
domestic audiences, decided to ignore this agreement and visited Yasukuni on 13 August 2001, rather than 
wait until after the anniversary. See Ed Griffith, “The Three Phases of China’s Response to Koizumi and 
the Yasukuni Shrine Issue: Structuration in Sino-Japanese Relations,” European Research Center on 
Contemporary Taiwan Online Paper Series (2012), 12. 
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term, including his last visit on 15 August 2006, marked the nadir in Japan’s postwar 
diplomatic relations with China and South Korea. 
b. Capacity of Prime Minister Visits 
The question of whether the visits to the shrine were done in an official or 
unofficial capacity added a new wrinkle in the Yasukuni debate. At issue is the postwar 
separation of church and state and the constitutionality of prime ministers visiting 
Yasukuni, or any shrine for that matter, in their official capacity as prime minister. In 
keeping with MacArthur’s Shinto directive, Article 20 of the 1946 Japanese Constitution 
prohibits governmental participation in any religious activity.40  While Yasukuni is the 
place where Japan’s war dead are honored, it is also a shrine. The debate in Japan, and 
elsewhere, is that Yasukuni’s religious foundations cause the provisions of the Shinto 
directive and Article 20 of the constitution to apply. In this context, Japanese prime 
ministers could be prohibited from visiting Yasukuni in their official capacity, as defined 
by any prime minister signing the Yasukuni entry ledger with his or her title, driving to 
the shrine in a government vehicle, or paying for wreaths with public funds. 
Aside from the constitutionality debate, the larger international 
community takes offense to official prime minister visits because of the symbolism such 
visits convey. Again, the fear is the message that such visits transmit: An unrepentant 
Japan bent on returning to its militarist roots. Conventional wisdom on the Yasukuni 
problem holds that the reason Prime Minister Nakasone’s 1985 visit was so controversial 
was because it was the first time that any visiting prime minister went in an official 
capacity. Conventional wisdom on this aspect of the infamous 1985 visit, however, is 
also wrong.  (The 1985 visit and the reactions it generated are compared later in the 
study.) 
c. Class-A War Criminals 
Of the many issues that complicate the Yasukuni controversy, perhaps 
none is more controversial than the enshrinement of fourteen Class-A war criminals at 
                                                 
40 “Constitution of Japan,” in Hugh Borton, Japan’s Modern Century (New York: Ronald Press, 
1955), 490–507. 
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Yasukuni.41  In May 1946, MacArthur, acting in his capacity as SCAP, convened the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) in Tokyo to promptly try and 
punish war criminals in the Far East. According to James McClain, the tribunals lasted 
more than two years and “indicted twenty-eight former high-ranking [Japanese] 
government and military leaders,” and “the tribunal sent seven men to the gallows, 
including Doihara Kenji and the former prime ministers Hirota Koki and Tojo Hideki.”42   
Many in Japan did not accept the verdict of the IMTFE and attempted to 
have those executed and/or deceased war criminals enshrined at Yasukuni. In 1966, the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare provided a list of war dead—inclusive of fourteen Class-
A war criminals—to the Yasukuni chief priest requesting their enshrinement. The priest, 
Tsukuba Fujimaro (former member of a branch of the Imperial family), understanding the 
political sensitivity of such a request, deferred interment. Tsukuba’s sudden death in 1977 
allowed a former Imperial Navy Luietenant Commander, Matsudaira Nagoyoshi, to 
assume the position of chief priest at Yasukuni. Since the final determination for who is 
enshrined rests with the chief priest, Matsudaira secretly enshrined the war criminals on 
17 October 1978.43 
The interment of war criminals at Yasukuni aggravated what was already 
a sensitive issue with those who suffered at the hands of Imperial Japan. The impact of 
the enshrinement was felt not only in neighboring Asian nations, but also within Japan, 
and at the highest levels. Prior to 1978, the emperor attended the annual festivals at 
Yasukuni, but after the enshrinement of the war criminals, the Showa Emperor never 
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returned to the shrine. After years of domestic criticism and international consternation, 
calls at the mass level in Japan have been made to the government and to Yasukuni to 
remove the Class A war criminals from the shrine. Those familiar with Shinto, however, 
understand that this is an impossible proposal. Since the Japanese presumably understand 
their dilemma, perhaps the suggestion of disenshrinement was made as an overture of 
good will to international audiences rather than a solution consistent with Shinto. 
In this context, while the enshrinement of war criminals is perhaps the 
most contentious issue in the Yasukuni debate, it is but one aspect of a much larger 
political problem besetting Japan’s regional relationships. Barring a workable solution to 
the enshrinement of Japan’s imperialistic past, this problem will likely persist for the 
foreseeable future.  
C. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Yasukuni problem is complex, indeed, and one cannot appreciate the 
responses in Beijing and Seoul to Japanese prime ministerial visits without an 
understanding of the relevant history. To understand Yasukuni is to understand the Shinto 
way of life. Just as Shinto is more than just a faith, Yasukuni is more than just a shrine. 
Yasukuni’s origins in the Meiji Restoration laid its war memorial foundation while 
Shinto provided its religious purpose. Those who died in service to Japan during that 
contentious period combined with World War II war criminals have cast Yasukuni in an 
odd light whereby it now represents the best and worst of Japan. That the shrine has 
become such a politically charged issue provides observers of the 64 Japanese prime 
ministerial visits since 1951 an opportunity to use this complex issue to analyze and 
assess governmental responses to them in China and South Korea. 
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III. POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND STATE LEADERSHIP 
The focus of this thesis is the effect that different political systems have on 
governmental responses to Japanese prime minister visits to Yasukuni. To that end, one 
must have a clear understanding of what the term “political system” means and why it 
matters. By defining this term and demonstrating its applicability to the PRC and the 
ROK, the reader can then move into the case studies with an appreciation of the political 
context in both countries during the 64 Yasukuni visits. Thus the goal of this chapter is to 
define these ambiguous terms and then apply them to China and South Korea dating back 
to approximately 1950 (coincidently the same observed period of Japanese prime 
minister visits to Yasukuni). 
A. POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
What does the term “political system” mean and why is it important to understand 
what system governs country?  Encyclopedia Britannica defines a political system as, 
“the set of formal legal institutions that constitute a ‘government’ or a ‘state.’”44  While a 
political system includes the formal type of government, it also captures the unique 
informal variables of politics, economics, and culture that further define how countries 
implement their version of their chosen system. The typology of political systems falls 
into three groups: consolidated democracies, transitional democracies, and authoritarian 
regimes.45  To these systems we now turn. 
1. Consolidated Democracies 
While neither of the countries in this study qualify as a consolidated democracy, it 
is helpful to define this particular system because it helps frame the other two. 
Consolidated democracies are established representative governments that abide by a 
minimum of accepted tenets of political democracy. Robert Dahl provides a list of seven 
criteria that define, at a minimum, what a democratic country should look like:  
                                                 
44 Encyclopedia Britannica, online ed., s.v.  “Political System.” 
45 Mark Kesselman, et al., Introduction to Comparative Politics (New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt Publishing, 2009), 20–24. 
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1. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested 
in elected officials. 
2. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in 
which coercion is comparatively uncommon. 
3. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials. 
4. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the 
government, though age limits may be higher for holding office than for 
the suffrage. 
5. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe 
punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of 
officials, the government, the regime, the socio-economic order, and the 
prevailing ideology. 
6. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. 
Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by 
law. 
7. To achieve their various rights . . . citizens also have a right to form 
relatively independent associations or organizations, including 
independent political parties and interest groups.46 
Important to note is that while consolidated democracies adhere to these 
institutions relatively consistently, they occasionally violate certain tenets. The key is that 
on the whole, they remain true to the core democratic principles and have done so for a 
sustained period of time.   
Dahl’s criteria are not a comprehensive list of democratic principles. Some 
political theorists advocate for the inclusion of additional conditions—such as a military 
that is subordinate to elected governmental control or the existence of a judiciary with 
powers independent of the executive and legislative branches—but these additions are 
helpful refinements that build on what Dahl outlined as the foundations of a democracy. 
2. Transitional Democracies 
The difference between consolidated and transitional democracies focuses on two 
criteria: (1) longevity or durability, and (2) the extent of their democratic practice. The 
first criterion focuses on time. How long has a country been a democracy?  At issue is the 
likelihood that the government will reverse to whatever its precondition was. While no 
minimum time standard necessarily exists, it is the author’s assertion that a country that 
                                                 
46 Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1982), 10–11. 
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has been practicing democracy for at least fifty years is likely to retain its core 
democratic principles. Countries with less than fifty years of democracy are no less likely 
to consolidate their political system, but they fall into a transitional category because their 
government has not weathered time and change to the extent needed for their democratic 
foundation to solidify.47 
Secondly, the extent of a country’s democratic practice determines whether the 
spirit of democracy is embraced or if the government merely adopted democratic 
trappings while retaining an authoritarian core. Two common ways transitional 
democracies might claim formal institutions of democracy while concealing other-than 
democratic practices is in elections and pluralism. Governments may hold elections but 
unduly influence their outcome through fear, intimidation, or persuasion. Alternatively, 
governments will hold free elections, but not necessarily fair elections—fair in that the 
opposition party stands a chance at winning. Postwar Japan serves as examples of such a 
case. From 1955 until 1993, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party dominated politics, 
making it essentially a one-party state. Mark Kesselman summarizes the difference 
between consolidated and transitional democracies well: “Compared to consolidated 
democracies, political authorities in transitional systems are much more likely to engage 
in corruption, control of the media, intimidation and violence against opponents, vote 
rigging, and other measures to make sure they get reelected.”48 
3. Authoritarianism 
The third type of political system, authoritarianism, is a system characterized by a 
high concentration of power in a single individual, a small group, or a single party or 
institution, such as the military. Fear, intimidation, censorship, and political repression 
define the character of authoritarian regimes. Such regimes take many forms, inclusive of 
communist party-states, theocracies, military governments, absolute monarchies, and 
personal dictatorships.49 
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Looking at authoritarian regimes, several characteristics emerge that suggest that 
authoritarianism is more than just failing to meet the items on the democratic checklist: 
Some authoritarian tenets of governance are polar opposites from those of a democratic 
form of government. Steven Levitsky and Luncan Way detail four arenas of democratic 
contestation that highlight the spirit of authoritarianism. The first is the electoral arena. In 
authoritarian regimes, the electoral process either does not exist or the ruling party 
dominates the electoral process through fear, intimidation, coercion, or persuasion to such 
a degree that the process becomes hollow and useless. The second arena is the legislative 
apparatus. Similar to the electoral process, a legislature either does not exist or is so 
thoroughly controlled by the regime that separation or conflict between the executive and 
legislative bodies is unthinkable. The third arena, the judiciary, is typically subordinated 
to the ruling party and is therefore subject to party influence. Lastly, and possibly most 
notable, is state control of the media. Levitsky and Way point out, “In most full-blown 
autocracies, the media are entirely state-owned, heavily censored, or systematically 
repressed.”50  
As a final note on today’s authoritarian states, it is becoming increasingly evident 
that they may coexist indefinitely with meaningful democratic institutions. Many 
authoritarian governments have moved away from their rigid forms of governance in 
favor of adopting certain democratic institutions, such as elections or measured 
privatization of media, in response to popular demands for it at the mass level. While 
authoritarian regimes may incorporate democratic elements in their governance, they do 
not embrace the spirit or core principles of democracy. Consequently, they risk instability 
by attempting to maintain a delicate balancing act between freedom and control. 
B. THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: POLITICAL SYSTEM AND 
STATE LEADERSHIP 
The government in Beijing serves as an example of a regime that began and has 
remained fully authoritarian, and, over time, has adopted certain democratic trappings in 
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response to public opinion; though this result has been decades in the making. The 
current political system in China dates back to 1949, but the roots of the Chinese state 
can be traced back to the early 20th century. Since the scope of this study is on Beijing’s 
response to Japanese prime minister visits to Yasukuni Shrine, the analysis of China’s 
political system need not reach farther than the Chinese Communist Party’s establishment 
of the People’s Republic. 
Though the review of the PRC’s political system focuses on the authoritarian 
aspect of governance from 1949 up to present day, the following analysis may be best 
broken down by three eras: Mao era authoritarianism (1949–1976), Deng era 
authoritarianism (1976–1989), and the post-Tiananmen era authoritarianism (1989-
present). In this way, the analysis demonstrates how and why China is an authoritarian 
regime while also unveiling the impact of key state leadership on politics over the 
observable period of Yasukuni visits. The goal of such an analysis is to help the reader 
put Beijing’s array of responses to Yasukuni into a Chinese domestic politics perspective. 
In so doing, the reader will better understand the unique political circumstances that 
Beijing was subject to, and how that differs from the South Korean context. 
1. Mao Era Authoritarianism 
Following Japan’s surrender in 1945, China was riven by civil war between 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party (Kuomintang [KMT]) and Mao Zedong’s Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). In 1949, after years of fighting and unsuccessful attempts at a 
coalition government (sponsored by the United States and assisted by the Soviet Union), 
Mao’s Communist forces decisively defeated Chiang’s KMT-led regime. Alice Miller 
and Richard Wich note, “On 1 October 1949, Mao proclaimed the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), while Chiang Kai-shek reestablished the Republic of 
China (ROC) in Taipei . . . Each regime claimed to the be the sole legitimate government 
of China, launching a contest over national sovereignty that persisted until the 1990s.”51   
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The division of territory and sovereignty had profound effects on the PRC, both 
internationally and domestically. From an international perspective, while the Communist 
revolution swept the nationalist off the mainland, it failed to change the United States’s 
orientation of formal recognition. The United States continued to back Chiang and the 
KMT in Taiwan, recognizing the ROC as the legitimate government of China. Beijing, 
consequently, suffered in diplomatic and economic isolation until 1972, when conflict in 
Indochina and a changing geopolitical landscape motivated Washington to align with 
Beijing in balance of power politics against Moscow.52  
Domestically, Mao sought to restore power and prestige to his new Republic, 
even at extreme cost. Said Kenneth Lieberthal of Mao, “Mao, in short, was a strong 
leader who would not shrink from bloodshed and sacrifice to reach his goals.”53  Mao’s 
goals of governing China and promoting revolutionary change were mutually 
antagonistic, which caused intense turmoil in the 1960s and 1970s. To achieve his goals, 
Mao demanded supreme authority over the Party and the people, evidenced by the CCP’s 
constitution that, in Frederick Teiwes’s opinion, “granted [Mao] formal powers to act 
unilaterally [from the Party collective leadership] in certain instances.”54 
Mao Zedong was driven by ideology, and the Chinese society under Mao was 
captivated by his ideas, charisma, and legacy, which gave him great latitude to implement 
bold policy initiatives—policy initiatives possible only in an authoritarian setting. For 
Mao, socialism, or the continuing class struggle, under the tenets of Marxism-Leninism 
was the driving idea behind his actions. Mao’s authoritative standing as Chairman of the 
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CCP and his legacy as the founder of the communist revolution in China is what afforded 
him the ability to implement his ideology. Mao led China as Chairman for nearly three 
decades, and over that period there are myriad examples one could highlight to 
demonstrate the authoritarian context of the time, but such an effort would exceed the 
scope needed to prove the point. Instead, the study focuses three policy initiatives under 
Mao that showcase authoritarian rule under Mao: the Hundred Flowers Campaign, the 
Great Leap Forward, and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. 
In the wake of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet Union 
under Nikita Khrushchev implemented reforms that sent off shock waves in the socialist 
camp. Known as “de-Stalinization,” the convulsions of how to address the gross abuses 
of Stalin threatened the cohesion of the Soviet bloc, evidenced most acutely by autonomy 
movements from Moscow in Poland and Hungary in the mid-1950s. In the burgeoning 
Sino-Soviet schism, Mao learned from what he perceived as Khrushchev’s mishandling 
of de-Stalinization and sought to avoid similar socialist clashes from occurring within 
China. The result was a “rectification campaign” aimed at addressing the roles of the 
rulers and the ruled in the Communist system. Of the Hundred Flowers campaign, Alice 
Miller and Richard Wich write:  
Mao permitted “a hundred flowers to bloom and a hundred schools of thought to 
contend,” an invitation to the Chinese people to vent their grievances and criticize 
the regime for its shortcomings and faults. A deluge of criticism was unleashed, 
producing such a challenge to the regime that the campaign was cut short after 
less than six weeks.55 
In this context, authoritarian characteristics of governance are clearly evident. 
Mao gave the freedom of speech to the people only to take it back sharply after the 
attendant criticism threatened that which he cherished most: power. 
After the first Five-Year Plan expired (1953–1957), Mao sought a new strategy to 
improve China’s economy and spearhead an initiative towards industrialization that built 
upon the successes of the previous plan while not exploiting the agricultural sector like 
the Soviet model recommended. For Mao, the Great Leap Forward (GLF) would serve as 
a catalyst towards a modern, industrialized, communist China. From 1958 through 1961, 
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the initiative ravaged the agrarian sector and resulted in calamity because Mao 
overestimated the power of mass mobilization and underestimated the time requirements 
to develop the factors of production to reach their full potential. The Great Leap caused 
rural starvation—perhaps the deadliest in human history—and, instead of advancing the 
economy, produced economic regression.56  Mao’s power and prestige suffered from the 
failure, but even though Mao’s power declined, it is notable that the GLF began not 
because of Mao’s power per se, but rather because of his visionary theory of China’s 
future. Moreover, the GLF represents a radical policy of collectivization that would 
otherwise be untenable in other political systems.   
The last thrust of authoritarian policy driven by Mao’s ideology was the initiation 
of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) from 1966–1976. In what would all 
too easily be attributed as a power play by Mao to eliminate political rivals who rose 
from the ashes of the GLF, a closer examination reveals that the GPCR was an extreme 
policy initiative that reflected Mao’s ideology of class struggle against the exploitative 
politicians and bureaucrats who fell out of touch with the people. Harry Harding asserts 
that in the early 1960s, Mao was dissatisfied with the policies that the Party was 
pursuing: “A return to private farming in agriculture, the resurrection of material 
incentives in industry, a concentration on urban medicine in public health, the 
development of a two-track system in education, and the reappearance of traditional 
themes and styles in literature and the arts.”57 These policies were, has Harding notes, 
“incompatible with his [Mao’s] vision of a socialist society,” compelling Mao to mobilize 
society to purify the party he helped create.58  
The political conflict that ensued out of the GPCR was a byproduct of Mao’s 
ideological differences with other Party elites. According to Harding, Mao deemed 
“‘Party persons in authority’ who might attempt to follow the capitalist road” as the 
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greatest threat to the socialist revolution.59 How Mao implemented his vision 
demonstrates the linkage between ideology, power, and policy. For Mao, the charismatic 
founder of the CCP who seemingly commanded the devotion of the Chinese, ideology 
was primary: a socialist revolution was needed. Mao then used his power to build the 
support base needed to carry out such an audacious plan. He bolstered his support base in 
the military through Lin Biao by politicizing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Mao 
enlisted the support of radical intellectuals who propagated both criticisms of Mao’s 
rivals and the ideology behind the GPCR. Lastly, Mao appealed to the mass student base, 
calling them to struggle against government leaders at all levels. The Cultural Revolution 
successfully muted Mao’s rivals, as demonstrated by the removal of the top two CCP 
power holders: Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. However, by attempting to prevent 
revisionism, Mao damaged the CCP’s ability to resist economic modernization policies 
later on, which ultimately undermined the ideology behind the GPCR and brought about 
the economic and structural change Mao sought to repress.  
Though Mao’s endeavors ended up damaging domestic society and international 
prestige, his actions were driven by socialist ideological commitments, the same 
commitments that bore fruit during Mao’s first revolution. Mao’s image from the civil 
war and rather successful period from 1949–1957 afforded him the latitude to implement 
such bold policies. More broadly, though, they reflect the unique characteristics of 
authoritarian rule under China’s famed leader. 
2. Deng Era Authoritarianism 
After Mao passed in 1976, the PRC took on a new character but held true to its 
authoritarian foundation. Hua Guafeng succeeded Mao, but his tenure was short-lived. 
The central figure in Chinese politics after Mao was Deng Xiaoping. Deng, much like 
Mao, was a leader with strong ideological commitments, but Deng differed from Mao in 
focus: Mao’s ideology focused on social revolution over economic progress while Deng’s 
ideology focused on economic modernization over social revolution. Though Deng’s 
pragmatic approach to Chinese modernization focused on rationale over socialist dogma, 
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his Marxist-Leninist commitments played the dominant role in policy formulation, and, 
because of his revolutionary achievements alongside Mao, he too commanded the respect 
from the masses. Those same commitments that compelled Deng to strengthen China’s 
economic base drove the agriculture and economic reform policies that were not feasible 
under Mao. 
After being twice purged from the CCP, Deng Xiaoping’s struggle for power 
resulted in his becoming the leader of the PRC in 1978, and his ideology changed the 
Party’s direction. His campaign for making practice the sole criteria for truth was aimed 
at the pursuit of economic policies that worked in practice (an implicit criticism of Mao’s 
blind pursuit of failed policies). Deng firmly believed that economic development was 
the best way for China to advance towards the ideal communist state in keeping with 
Marxist-Leninist ideology, and that Mao’s class struggle-centered policies were 
misguided. 
Deng believed that China could tolerate capitalist economic methods to build its 
economic base while remaining true to socialism and, by doing so, China would progress 
in the initial stages, albeit for quite a while, to reach its full potential. In this context, 
Deng implemented agricultural and economic reforms that moved the Chinese economy 
away from its traditional command economy towards a market economy. These reforms 
helped grow the economy at nearly ten percent annually, but as the economy grew, so too 
did the unexpected political volatility of policy expansion and contraction through the 
1980s. Yet that political volatility was a manifestation of Deng’s belief in adjusting 
policy through practice. Throughout his tenure, his ideological commitments stood firm 
and his power allowed him to shape the country in accordance with his vision of China’s 
future. 
While Deng recognized that China needed to reform to advance with the modern 
industrialized world, he did not hesitate to leverage the control afforded him in an 
authoritarian system. Two examples highlight this tendency: the 1978–79 Democracy 
Wall movement and the Tiananmen protest movement. In 1977, Deng charged Hu 
Yaobang with the rehabilitation of those purged during the GPCR. A controversial topic 
for several reasons, not least of which being victims of the Cultural Revolution working 
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alongside their former accusers, Hu energetically led efforts to correct as many Party 
wrongs as possible. Rehabilitating the purged undermined the logic of the GPCR, an 
initiative Hua Guafeng sought to defend. The political space that Hu’s effort generated 
led to protests. Protestors arguing for a wide range of issues posted their proclamations 
on what became known as Democracy Wall, which quickly got the attention of Party 
leadership. Deng initially supported the movement because it helped him wrest power 
from Hua, but his short-term gains cost him in the long-run. The protests shifted in focus 
from the despotism of Mao to dictatorship in China more broadly (a threat to the regime), 
with activists demanding democracy. In 1979, Deng, who had never favored democracy, 
put an end to Democracy Wall and imprisoned key political activists.60 
The 1989 Tiananmen protest demonstrates the depth of power and control that 
authoritarian regimes wield. Characteristic of regime governance under Deng was an 
oscillation of policy reform and retrenchment. The year 1985 saw a surge of policy 
reform, notably in science, technology, and urban economics. These reforms, 
championed by Hu Yaobang (architect of the Commission for Sino-Japanese Friendship 
in the Twenty-first Century), created economic winners and losers in China. In 1986, 
when the policy pendulum swung back, popular demand forced Deng to remove Hu from 
his post. The next cycle of policy volatility in 1987 and 1988 divided the Party to such an 
extent that calamity was all but a certainty. The sudden death of Hu Yaobang in 1989 
sparked student protests, calling on the Party to recognize the merits of the purged 
reformer. The demonstrations over Hu grew and shifted in focus to the regime itself. 
Facing mounting opposition, on 3 June 1989 Deng and his colleagues ordered the PLA to 
intervene. The action resulted in thousands of civilians killed and wounded for exercising 
their freedom of speech defined in Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution.61 
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3. Post-Tiananmen Authoritarianism 
Though Beijing recovered in certain aspects from the Tiananmen tragedy, the 
event set the precedent for Chinese state-society relationships. The memory of the 
massacre lingers on, both for any would-be opposition movements and for the regime 
itself. For Chinese citizens, they understand the political context in which they exist: play 
by the rules or suffer the consequences. For the regime, they realize that intra-Party 
division creates opportunities that the masses can exploit. The somewhat tacit state-
society social contract is particularly important with regard to China’s Japan policy. 
Japanese provocations, such as prime minister visits to Yasukuni, generate swells of anti-
Japanese nationalism at the mass level to which the Party must respond. Both 
participants, the regime and the masses, understand that each has limits to how far they 
can push their agenda. The regime knows that if they are not responsive to public opinion 
they risk national uprising reminiscent to Tiananmen. The people, on the other hand, 
know that if they protest beyond the regime’s limits of dissent, they risk harsh 
suppression. The delicate balancing act constrains China’s Japan policy and frustrates the 
fragile state-society relationship. 
Post-Tiananmen China has witnessed the adoption of many democratic 
institutions while retaining its authoritarian foundation. Regarding the role of the 
military, just as largely as the PLA was politicized under Mao, Jiang Zemin (General 
Secretary of the CCP, 1989–2002) decoupled the military from politics, making it 
subordinate to state leadership.62  Regarding elections, while the PRC is a one-party state, 
elections are held down to the local level, and leaders are accountable to their 
constituencies in that they can be replaced with another Party nominee for poor 
performance. At the highest levels, China is reforming its electoral processes by allowing 
each Party congress to elect its leadership at its own territorial level rather than rely on 
the legacy nomenklatura appointments (Soviet-style list of leading positions, candidates, 
and rules, all of which the Party controls).63  The regime has also relaxed its 
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control/censorship over the media and the Internet, though the Party exercises control 
over these to prevent uncontrolled access to information from leading to chaos. 
For all these reasons, the PRC is clearly an authoritarian state. The PRC has been 
and continues today to be a one-party state. China under Mao was characterized by a 
commanding figure that enjoyed the political latitude to engage or ignore domestic or 
international stimuli (as in the case of Yasukuni) consistent with socialist principles. 
China under Deng focused on economic advances to guide its foreign and domestic 
policy. While post-Tiananmen China has adopted some trappings of democracy, they are 
merely window dressing for what is still—and will be for the foreseeable future—a 
thoroughly authoritarian regime. 
C. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: POLITICAL SYSTEM AND STATE 
LEADERSHIP 
The ROK presents a useful case study for this thesis, for over the observed period 
the ROK started out authoritarian but then democratized in 1988. The change of political 
system lends credibility in both the findings of Seoul’s response to Yasukuni, but also in 
comparison to Beijing’s. How authoritarian South Korea responded versus how 
democratizing South Korea responded is important and makes the comparison to itself 
and to another authoritarian state useful. The following analysis outlines the ROK’s 
authoritarian beginnings and its transition to democracy. 
1. Authoritarian South Korea (1948–1988) 
The end of Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula in 1945 left the country 
divided at the 38th parallel, with the United States administering the southern territory 
and the Soviet Union administering the north. After attempts to hold peninsula-wide 
elections failed, the two nation-states of South Korea and North Korea were created in 
1948. Within two years and after the departure of both Soviet and United States forces, 
the peninsula became embroiled in civil war that ravaged the Korean people and territory. 
The Korean War exacted a heavy toll on the ROK, decimating the South Korean 
economy and infrastructure. In response to the heavy burden of rebuilding a war-torn 
nation, the South Korean leadership took on a decidedly authoritarian character for the 
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proceeding four decades. Thus, this section focuses on three regimes: Rhee Syngman, 
Park Chung-hee, and Chun Doo-hwan. 
In 1948, Rhee Syngman became the first president of the ROK. Beset by the 
division of the Korean peninsula and internal strife over the residual American 
occupation, Rhee struggled to build a state out of the impoverished country he inherited. 
Rhee had long desired to lead South Korea and, once installed as its leader, was quick to 
stamp out any resistance movements to his rule (primarily from the ROK political left). 
Rhee’s brutal suppression of Communist and other opposition movements set South 
Korea on an authoritarian footing. Before any serious economic initiatives got off the 
ground, though, war visited his country once again, and the devastation of its aftermath 
left Rhee with more challenges than when he first took office. Bruce Cumings 
summarizes the general atmospherics of 1950s South Korea well: “South Korea in the 
1950s was a terribly depressing place, where extreme privation and degradation touched 
everyone.”64 
Despite Rhee’s significant exposure to democracy in the United States during his 
self-initiated exile during the Japanese occupation (1904–10; 1912–45), the fratricidal 
conflict only exacerbated Rhee’s proclivity towards authoritarianism. Rhee’s political 
suppression continued in the post-conflict years as did his intolerance for opposition. In 
an effort to solidify his position of power, Rhee engaged in crony capitalism, giving state 
patronage to the various chaebol in exchange for political support.65  By rigging elections 
in 1956 and 1960, Rhee dominated domestic politics until widespread reform movements 
in 1960 forced his resignation.66 
                                                 
64 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 
303. 
65 “Chaebol” refers to the large, family-owned business conglomerates that exercise monopolistic or 
oligopolistic control over various business sectors. According to Cummings, Rhee gave low purchase 
prices on former Japanese industries to chaebol in exchange for political support. The owner of Samsung, 
Yi Pyong-chol, for example, was accused of providing 64 million won to Rhee’s party. See Cumings, 
Korea’s Place in the Sun, 306–08, 326–27. 
66 “Syngman Rhee,” The Cold War Files, The Wilson Center, last accessed April 8, 2013, 
http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/coldwarfiles/index-33794.html. 
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The period of Rhee’s tenure (1948–1960) marked a low point in ROK-Japan 
relations. Rhee harbored deep distrust and animosity towards the Japanese: It was the 
Japanese that occasioned his 33-year exile. As such, South Koreans under Rhee’s 
influence remained intransigent and contemptuous towards Japan, making normalization 
impossible at the time. However, the political context between the ROK and Japan 
changed after Rhee was deposed. 
 As concentrated as political power was in Rhee, it pales in comparison to Korea’s 
next autocratic leader, Park Chung-hee. In 1961, following the political turmoil in Rhee’s 
wake, Major General Park led a military junta that toppled the ROK transitional 
government. Park’s forceful seizure of power meant that he had much more freedom of 
action in regards to policy initiatives and governance if not the latitude to completely 
ignore public opinion. Unlike Rhee who was vindictive against the Japanese, Park was a 
pragmatist who saw Japan’s economic success as a model to emulate. Park, however, had 
to persuade South Koreans that normalizing relations with Japan was necessary for 
economic improvement—an immensely unpopular proposition. 
From the moment Park took power, he sought to improve relations with Japan, 
even at considerable cost. Park, a noted “Japanophile” whose military career was 
nurtured by the Japanese during the occupation, pursued normalization for several years 
after taking office.67  In 1965 the two nations normalized relations, resulting in an 
emotional explosion amongst large segments of South Korea against Park.68  Not one to  
 
                                                 
67 According to Lee Chong-sik, Park was a graduate of the “Manchukuo and Japanese military 
academies and a first lieutenant in the Japanese army.”  See Lee Chong-sik, Japan and Korea: The 
Political Dimension (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), 45. 
68 The 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea normalized 
diplomatic relations and included a separate settlement on property and claims—war reparations—that 
totaled $800 million ($300 million in Japanese grants, $200 million in government loan from the Overseas 
Development Aid fund, and $300 million in commercial loans). Koreans viewed the settlement as dismally 
low and the treaty as renewed Japanese economic and political exploitation. See Lee, Japan and Korea, 
54–55; “Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea,” Database of Japanese 
Politics and International Relations, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, last accessed April 
8, 2013, http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19650622.T1E.html; “Agreement 
Between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Settlement of Problems in regard to Property and 
Claims and Economic Co- Operation,” International Legal Materials 5, no. 1 (1966): 111–117. 
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tolerate opposition, Park ordered the ROK army and police to suppress protesters. The 28 
August 1965 FBIS Daily Report describes Park’s actions: 
Immediately after a secret conference of Pak Chong-hui [sic] and military 
leaders, an ROK division was moved into Seoul from the demilitarized 
zone. The division is [sic] armed with tanks and armored cars. 
Demonstrators were beaten at random by troops, and on 26 August about 
150 persons were wounded and 280 demonstrators were arrested.69 
Park’s vision of a secure Republic hinged on economic prosperity, as enunciated 
in his famous dictum, “Rich country, strong army.”70  By assiduously investing in heavy 
industrialization, Park, through the chaebol, achieved economic takeoff. Park’s 
industrialization initiative, “the Big Push,” built up areas of South Korea of his choosing, 
while ignoring rural development elsewhere.71  In so doing, Park sowed the seeds of 
economic inequality that both he and his successor would reap. While Park engaged in 
economic winner-picking, the Korean economy writ large benefitted from his initiatives. 
By 1990, the South Korean economy was growing at nearly 10 percent annually, with 
low inflation (2–5 percent) and unemployment (2–4 percent), all driven by Park’s one-
party regime.72  The period from 1961–1979 can therefore be characterized as intense 
focus on improving the ROK’s security through economic prosperity—a major factor in 
the Yasukuni analysis. 
In 1979, for reasons unknown, Kim Chae-gyu, chief of the Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency, murdered Park. The ensuing political upheaval set the conditions for 
the emergence of another military regime under Major General Chun Doo-hwan. Quickly 
seizing the political initiative, Chun dissolved the National Assembly and all political 
parties, and established a state of martial law to quell domestic tension. The response was 
                                                 
69 Moscow in Korean to Korea, August 28, 1965, in FBIS Asia, August 30, 1965, BB12. 
70 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, 317. 
71 The Big Push was program of heavy and chemical industrialization focused on the development of 
six sectors: steel, automobiles, chemicals, shipbuilding, machine tools, and electronics. The preponderance 
of chaebol receiving state patronage were those in or near Park’s hometown. See Cumings, Korea’s Place 
in the Sun, 322–26. 
72 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, 340. 
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not well received, and opposition movements in the Cholla province—an area the Big 
Push left behind—tested the resolve of Chun’s so-called democracy. 
On 18 May 1980, hundreds of protestors took to the streets in Kwangju 
demanding an end to the martial law enacted by Chun earlier that year. In response, Chun 
ordered elite paratroopers into Kwangju to suppress the movement.  “Paratroopers . . . 
landed in the city and began the indiscriminate murder of students, women, children—
anyone who got in their way,” notes Bruce Cumings.73  Thousands died in Kwangju, and, 
similarly to Tiananmen, these people supposedly enjoyed Constitutional provisions of 
freedom of speech and assembly. Chun blamed the Kwangju incident on political 
dissident Kim Dae-jung—Park Chung-hee’s chief rival who, by this time, had become 
the political vanguard of Cholla Province. The persecution of Kim would have 
implications on ROK-Japan relations later in the 1980s.74 
In February 1981, Chun inaugurated himself president. Yet, even as president he 
continued his repressive tactics, likely in an effort to mimic the climate Park Chung-hee 
commanded. Chun “purged or proscribed the political activities of 800 politicians and 
8,000 officials in government and business,” and imprisoned some “37,000 journalists, 
students, teachers, labor organizers, and civil servants into ‘purification camps,’” 
according to Bruce Cumings.75  In the mid-1980s, Chun vastly increased the size of 
paramilitary riot police, whose charter it was to suppress demonstrations. Rather than 
consolidate his power base, Chun’s brutal tactics drove what little support he had away, 
thus setting the stage for political reform. 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 382. 
74 Kim Dae-jung had a large impact on Korean politics, dating back to 1971. The complexity of Kim’s 
political activity dramatically impacted ROK-Japan relations throughout the 1980s, to include the 
calibration of Korean policy towards Japanese prime minister visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, as well as the 
ROK’s transition to democracy. Bruce Cumings notes, “[Kim] was run over by a truck in 1971, kidnapped 
in 1973, put under house arrest until 1979, indicted in 1980 on trumped-up charges of having fomented the 
Kwangju Rebellion and nearly executed until the Carter and Reagan administrations . . . jointly intervened 
in late 1980, exiled to the United States in 1982, returned to house arrest again in 1985, and finally able to 
run in the 1987 direct presidential elections, only to lose when the opposition once again split and Kim 
Young Sam ran against him, thus electing Roh Tae Woo with a little over one-third of the vote. Kim’s mass 
appeal sharply transformed Korea’s pattern of authoritarianism and elite democracy.”  Quoted from 
Cummings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, 366. 
75 Cummings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, 384. 
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2. Democratization (1988-present) 
The democratization movement in the ROK had been fomenting since the days of 
Park Chung-hee, but became peculiarly acute in the mid-1980s. By 1985, Chun had 
become increasingly unpopular, and the opposition movement waited for the right 
opportunity to mobilize. The 24th Olympiad in Seoul proved to be the catalyst for 
change. 
In 1985, South Korean society, tired by decades of military regimes, sought to end 
the perpetuation of military regime dominance and pressed for a constitutional 
amendment allowing direct presidential elections. In the face of mounting opposition, 
Chun—mindful of the coming Olympic games—agreed to support constitutional change 
and also agreed to leave office at the end of his term in 1988. Chun, however, preferred to 
pick his successor so that he could hold on to power from behind the scenes. In April 
1987, after waiting for a break in the democratic momentum, Chun reversed his decision 
to support constitutional change. Chun quickly nominated his trusted colleague Roh Tae-
woo to succeed him, knowing that Roh would easily dominate elections in an 
authoritarian setting. 
The country erupted in protests. Knowing that any implementation of martial law 
similar to Kwangju would jeopardize the Olympics and thus embarrass the ROK on the 
international stage, protestors used this constraint to their advantage and pressed for 
political reform. Rather than scuttle the Olympiad, Roh split with Chun in June 1987 and 
agreed to free and fair presidential elections. The December 1987 presidential elections 
ended authoritarianism in the ROK, ushering in a new era of transitional democracy.76 
Since 1988, the ROK has retained strong democratic underpinnings that appear 
durable. Free and fair national elections have occurred every five years for the 
presidency, to include election of the first opposition party nominee in 1998, Kim Dae-
jung. Unlike the previous military regimes that could leverage the autocratic tools of 
censorship or violence to steer public opinion, elected officials must be responsive to 
                                                 
76 Chalmers Johnson, “South Korean Democratization: The Role of Economic Development,” The 
Pacific Review 2, no.1 (1989): 8. 
 45
public opinion. For all intents and purposes, the ROK seems to have shed its authoritarian 
skin in favor of representative government, but only time will tell. 
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Political systems can reveal much about what can be expected from a government 
in terms of response to certain stimuli and how that response is implemented. With regard 
to Yasukuni, one might expect a democracy to react differently than an authoritarian 
regime because a representative government must be responsive to public demand 
whereas authoritarian regimes can ignore or suppress public opinion with impunity. To 
discover why the central governments in the PRC and ROK responded in the manner they 
did to Japanese prime minister visits to Yasukuni demands a clear understanding of the 
system within which each operates. In China, the authoritarian rule the People’s Republic 
was founded in persists to this day. Veteran revolutionaries like Mao and Deng 
implemented bold policy initiatives with varying degrees of success, and both leveraged 
draconian measures to reign in public opinion when the desired outcome was not 
achieved. Today, Beijing finds itself balancing between political liberalization and 
control over the populace. Calls for political liberalization cannot be completely ignored, 
yet regime survival is the leadership’s top priority. How Beijing reconciles what would 
appear to be mutually antagonistic outcomes will be interesting to observe. 
In the ROK, post-conflict conditions demanded an approach for which 
authoritarianism seemed the best fit. Years of political persecution, corruption, and 
ineffective economic reform under Rhee led to a national uprising that left a void that the 
military filled. The first military regime under Park Chung-hee, while brutal, steered 
South Korea towards economic prosperity. The second military regime under Chun Doo-
hwan tried to mimic the achievements of the Park regime, but came up short and instead 
distanced the regime from the public. In their pursuit of political reform, South Koreans 
leveraged unique conditions to set the ROK on a democratic footing. The successful 
transition to democracy led to many significant political changes, not the least of which 
being demands for response to Japanese provocations. 
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With the foundation for the study explained, we now turn to the case studies to 
see how the political systems in both countries impacted the observed responses to the 
Yasukuni Shrine. 
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IV. BEIJING’S RESPONSE TO JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER 
VISITS TO YASUKUNI 
Since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, Japanese prime ministers 
have been visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, and Beijing’s response to these visits has varied 
from ignoring them to lodging state objection to them, and degrees in between. The 
purpose of this chapter is to measure Beijing’s observable response to each of the 
64 prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni and determine what patterns exist and why. To 
this end, a chronological approach of the visits from 1951 to present day establishes what 
the government in Beijing did, if anything, in response to each visit. Where no observable 
response existed, Beijing’s motivations for ignoring visits are assessed in the context of 
prevailing Sino-Japanese bilateral relations. Beijing’s responses are thus graded as either 
ignoring the visit or responding to it with any type of official objection to the visit itself 
(not to Yasukuni in general). Since state leadership affects the character of the 
government, the following analysis follows a chronology that mirrors the PRC section of 
the previous chapter. 
The argument advanced in this chapter is that up 1982, China largely ignored 
Japanese prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni. Between 1982 and 1985, Beijing reversed 
the pattern of previous decades, but was inconsistent in its responses. The trend through 
the mid-1990s and the 2000s is of increasing and consistent objection. A recurring theme 
revealed in all of Beijing’s responses is clear: China wishes to discourage Japan from 
returning to its militaristic past. 
A. YASUKUNI VISITS DURING THE MAO ERA 
Mao served as the chairman of the CCP from the founding of the PRC in 
1949 until his death in 1976. During his tenure, six Japanese prime ministers visited 
Yasukuni Shrine thirty times (nearly half of all Yasukuni visits over the rated period). No 
evidence was found to support the claim that Beijing lodged an official protest over any 
of these visits. But that is not to say that the Yasukuni Shrine and its attendant symbolism 
did not resonate in Beijing during this period. With no observable responses or published 
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policy with which to definitively prove Beijing’s position on the matter, however, one 
must look at bilateral relations to explain why over the longest stretch the Beijing 
leadership ignored so many visits—the same kind of visits that caused passionate swells 
of anti-Japanese nationalism later on. A review of the bilateral relations under each 
Japanese prime minister reveals some possible explanations. 
One characteristic of the PRC government under Mao worth noting is the 
victorious historic narrative of the People’s Republic. Mao led the Communist revolution 
that defeated the imperialist Japanese and the Kuomintang, and his rhetoric of Chinese 
strength defined much of Chinese foreign policy throughout this period. Relations with 
the Japanese from 1949 through 1976 are indicative of this historic narrative.77 
1. Yoshida Shigeru (1948–1954) 
Prime Minister Yoshida, Japan’s first prime minister after the American 
occupation, visited Yasukuni five times. All five visits occurred during the spring and 
autumn festivals. The first three visits (18 October 1951, 17 October 1952, and 23 April 
1953) occurred against the backdrop of the Korean War (25 June 1950 - 27 July 1953), 
and, more specifically, after Chinese People’s Volunteer intervention in November 1950. 
In the context of such a violent and complicated conflict, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the visit of Japan’s prime minister to the Yasukuni Shrine might not register as high as it 
might during more peaceful conditions. 
On the other hand, in light of the San Francisco treaty, Mao had some incentive to 
rally popular opinion against Japan in 1951. The peace treaty Yoshida signed on 
8 September 1951 was not signed by the People’s Republic of China (nor the Republic of 
China, for that matter). Mao could have easily made issue of Yoshida’s visit to Yasukuni, 
if for nothing more than to bring awareness of China’s exclusion from the peace treaty 
and foment anti-Japanese fervor. Similarly, Mao took no observable issue with Yoshida’s 
                                                 
77 Given China’s low economical standing and its precarious geostrategic location respective of the 
two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) from 1950s though the late 1970s, Beijing saw 
itself as weak and vulnerable. For this reason, Beijing’s rhetoric was that it was strong and powerful. 
Beijing’s bold economic initiatives (the Great Leap) and relocating its defense industrial sector deep within 
the interior (third front) over the same period attest to this reality. 
 49
1952 Yasukuni visit, which came not even six months after Japan entered into a peace 
treaty with the Republic of China—effectively barring any chance of entering into the 
same with the PRC. Beijing could have protested Yoshida’s visit as a proxy for 
dissatisfaction with Tokyo’s de facto recognition of Taipei, yet they did not. Both events 
suggest that Yasukuni did not rate high enough for Mao to respond to in any meaningful 
way. 
2. Kishi Nobusuke (1957–1960) 
Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke was the next Japanese prime minister to go to 
Yasukuni after Yoshida, visiting twice: once in the spring of 1957 and again in the fall of 
1958.78  While neither visit elicited a response from Beijing, it should be noted that the 
state of affairs between China and Japan under Kishi can be characterized as one of crisis, 
which begs the question why Beijing ignored an opportunity to criticize Tokyo. From the 
onset of his tenure as prime minister, Kishi’s past service in the wartime regime and 
present pro-Taiwan inclinations alarmed Beijing.79  In June 1957, after merely five 
months in office (and only two months after visiting Yasukuni), Kishi conducted a  
15-day good-will tour of six Southeast Asian countries, culminating in a visit to 
Taiwan—making Kishi the first Japanese prime minister to visit the ROC. While Beijing 
did not object to Kishi’s Southeast Asia tour, his visit to Taipei angered regime 
leadership and set China on an anti-Kishi footing. Premier Zhou Enlai described the 
political climate well: “This [visit to Taiwan] made the Chinese people angry. In other 
words, Premier Kishi’s behavior in Taiwan has antagonized 600 million Chinese 
people.”80  Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated from the remainder of Kishi’s tenure. 
Adding to the troubled ties between China and Japan was the forthcoming 
revision of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty. Beijing was concerned that Kishi would 
                                                 
78 For reasons unknown, Prime Ministers Hatoyama Ichiro (1954–56) and Ishibashi Tanzan (1956–57) 
did not pay tribute at the shrine. Both prime ministers were renowned for their efforts to build relationships 
with the PRC. Their combined tenure spanned the majority of the PRC’s very successful first five-year 
plan. The early success Mao enjoyed from 1953–57 might have distracted him enough from Yasukuni even 
if either of Kishi’s predecessors had visited, but this is mere speculation. 
79 Reference to Kishi’s affiliation with the wartime regime from Miller and Wich, Becoming Asia, 61. 
80 Peking, Chinese International Service, July 25, 1957, in FBIS Asia, July 26, 1957, AAA6. 
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accentuate Japan’s security ties to the United States and extend Japan’s power in Taiwan 
and Southeast Asia.81  Sino-Japanese ties reached a nadir in 1958 when China ceased all 
trade and exchanges with Japan. On 2 May, as Chinese tempers flared with regard to 
Kishi’s pro-Taiwan stance, an incident at a Nagasaki department store involving a 
Japanese disgracing a PRC flag provided Beijing the opportunity to take punitive action 
against Japan for Kishi’s support to Taiwan under the auspices of what became known as 
the Nagasaki Flag incident. 
Kishi’s perceived “anti-Beijing” approach soured Japan’s relationship with China 
(as compared to relations under previous Japanese prime ministers), but the problem was 
exacerbated by China’s hard-line foreign and domestic policies, evidenced in the 
heightening of tension in the Taiwan Strait, the growing Sino-Soviet schism, and the self-
sufficiency policy exemplified in the Great Leap Forward. Trade and exchanges between 
the two countries suffered until the transition in Japanese leadership in 1960.82 
3. Ikeda Hayato (1960–1964) 
Prime Minister Ikeda visited Yasukuni five times, and each time Beijing looked 
the other way. The motivations that could account for these outcomes seem to be 
economic. Following Japan’s toxic state of affairs with China under Kishi, Ikeda ushered 
in a new character of leadership, one that China was receptive to and used to repair the 
two-year economical drought from the previous prime minister.  “Ikeda,” according to 
Chalmers Johnson, “maintained a public hard-line, anti-P.R.C. position to placate the 
U.S.” while supporting various economic initiatives to bring trade with China back to the 
pre-1957 status quo, which, by 1956, represented nearly thirty percent of Japan’s trade in 
Northeast Asia.83  The “friendly trade” agreement of 1960 and the Liao-Takasaki trade 
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agreement in 1962 serve as two examples of such initiatives.84  In this context and with 
regards to Yasukuni, economic advance trumped unsettled historical scores. 
4. Sato Eisaku (1964–1972) 
Of all postwar Japanese prime ministers, Prime Minister Sato’s eleven visits over 
eight years were the most by any prime minister to Yasukuni to date, though all eleven 
visits were done during festivals. China largely ignored all eleven visits.85  Yet again, this 
is not indicative of a healthy relationship between the two countries. Quite to the 
contrary, the relationship over this period was rather acrimonious. Sato, a member of the 
Kishi faction of the Liberal Democratic Party, was a vitriolic opponent of Beijing, and 
Beijing was equally hostile to what was termed the “reactionary Sato government.”86  
Similar to Kishi’s policies, Sato’s pro-Taiwan stance and his proclivity to appease 
Washington discolored relations with Beijing over this period. 
Despite the bilateral tension, however, improvements in China-Japan ties were in 
the offing. Sato presided over Japan during a period of intense transition with regard to 
relations with China. Up to 1972, Japan’s China policy was constrained by Washington’s 
expectation that Tokyo would follow its lead in isolating the PRC in favor of maintaining 
ties with ROC. Such constraints frustrated Tokyo’s desires to reap the economic benefits 
of trade with mainland China. Tokyo’s creative policy of separating politics from 
economics (seikei bunri) to pursue trade with the PRC circumvented these U.S.-imposed 
constraints. The shifting geopolitical landscape of the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
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however, positioned Sato to remedy Japan’s informal relationship with China by laying 
the foundation for a change in the status of relations between Japan and China. 
By 1965, Japan had eclipsed the Soviet Union as the PRC’s largest trading 
partner.87  Economic progress might explain why Beijing chose to ignore Sato’s visits to 
Yasukuni, despite the disharmonious relationship between the two. Sato’s next three—
visits in 1966, 1967, and 1968—were likely overshadowed by the domestic upheaval in 
the PRC with the onset of Mao’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. What was not 
overlooked, though, was Sato’s September 1967 visit to Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei. 
Beijing news agencies viciously criticized Sato for being a “faithful running dog of the 
U.S. imperialists,” and for conducting “conspiratorial activities” in Taiwan to build upon 
a “two China” plot.88 
Nineteen sixty-nine was a turbulent year in China-Japan relations. Firstly, 
1969 marked the centennial of the Yasukuni Shrine. In June, the rightist faction of the 
LDP introduced a Yasukuni Shrine bill in the Japanese Diet that proposed state 
sponsorship of the shrine. Beijing was quick to criticize the legislation, stating that the 
effort revealed Japanese attempts to revive militaristic nationalism.89  While not in 
response to either of Sato’s spring or autumn visits to the shrine, Beijing’s response to the 
bill indicates that it was aware of Yasukuni and rejected any attempts by Tokyo to 
support it. 
Secondly, Beijing’s criticism of Yasukuni was buttressed by increased Japanese 
Self-Defense Force (SDF) spending, evidenced by Tokyo’s purchase of over one hundred 
F-4 Phantom fighter aircraft and increased defense spending on ground, air, and maritime 
force structure.90  The final provocation came in November with the Sato-Nixon 
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communiqué—a bilateral agreement between Tokyo and Washington that, among several 
things, called on Japan to take on a greater defense role in the region.91 
Following the “Nixon shocks” of the summer of 1971, Sato laid the foundation 
for shifting diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.92  In January 1971, despite 
Beijing’s openly hostile polemics towards Tokyo, Sato advised the Diet that normalizing 
relations with the “People’s Republic of China” (the first time he used China’s official 
name) was on the political agenda and started new initiatives to usher in a new China 
policy.93  Beijing, however, was so distrustful of Sato that it ignored Sato’s request to 
visit Beijing and delayed diplomatic recognition until Sato was no longer prime minister. 
Even after Sato relayed his intentions to recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate 
government of China and of Japan’s readiness to abrogate its peace treaty with the ROC, 
Zhou Enlai eschewed normalization negotiations, stating, “Even if Sato accepted the 
three basic principles as the basis of opening talks with us, we shall not accept Sato as a 
negotiating partner.”94  Thus, while normalization initiatives emerged under Sato at the 
expense of his preferred “two China” policy, the acrimonious relationship China 
                                                 
91 China perceived the communiqué as a step towards a stronger and potentially militaristic Japan, 
particularly with regard to Japanese security interests being explicitly and inextricably linked to those of 
Taiwan. 
92 The two Nixon shocks of 1971 refer to the abrupt transformation of the Sino-American relationship 
and the decision to abandon the Bretton Woods system of international financial exchange. Both shocks 
represented a dramatic change in the political geometry of the region and presented Tokyo with an 
opportunity to end the informal economic relationships in favor of full diplomatic recognition. See Miller 
and Wich, Becoming Asia, 175–76. 
93 With regard to Yasukuni, Sato visited the shrine on 22 April 1971, which Beijing ignored. On 15 
August, however, the Sato cabinet held World War II commemoration ceremonies in various locations 
(including one at the Yasukuni Shrine, though not attended by Sato) to which Beijing delivered scathing 
criticisms. According to Chinese press, August 1971 is the first time Tokyo sponsored such 
commemorative events. Beijing’s reaction demonstrates the lingering sensitivities of Japanese imperialism 
associated with 15 August, which would have implications for future Japanese administrations. See Peking 
NCNA International Service in English, August 17, 1971, in FBIS Asia, August 18, 1971, A2. 
94 Quoted in Gene Hsiao, “The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement: A Relationship of Ambivalence,” in 
Sino-American Détente and Its Policy Implications, ed. Gene Hsiao (New York: Praeger, 1974), 165. The 
“three principles for the restoration of relations” put forward by the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China in the 1972 Sino-Japanese communiqué, to which Zhou Enlai referred, are “(1) The People’s 
Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; (2) Taiwan is an inalienable part of territory of the 
People’s Republic of China; (3) “Peace Treaty” between Japan and Chiang Kaishek authorities is illegal 
and it must be abrogated”; quoted from “Bilateral Political Relations,” China Internet Information Center, 
accessed May 2, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn. 
 54
maintained with Japan ensured that normalization fell to the next prime minister to 
conclude. 
5. Tanaka Kakuei (1972–1974) 
The transition to Prime Minister Tanaka in 1972 allowed the PRC to continue 
Sato’s normalization initiatives while saving face with domestic and international 
audiences by following through on their policy of not working with regimes unfriendly to 
China. Tanaka by all accounts was more pragmatic in his economic focus in relations 
with China compared to Sato, and his previous experience as minister of finance and 
international trade and industry accounts for his firm belief in the power of money in 
politics. Chalmers Johnson notes that trade with China continued under Sato but 
increased dramatically under Tanaka.95  Yet, even as economic interests advanced 
bilateral relations between Japan and China, they also constrained advances toward 
normalization. Gene Hsiao notes that Japanese trade with Taiwan reached a record high 
in 1972, and that Japan’s close ties with Taiwan impeded Sino-Japanese normalization 
initiatives. Thus, while the 1972 joint communiqué concluded diplomatic recognition 
between governments and Sino-Japanese trade substantially increased under Tanaka, 
unresolved issues—including Taiwan—delayed Tanaka’s normalization initiatives 
(initiated in September 1974) for several years.96 
During his tenure as prime minister, Tanaka visited the Yasukuni Shrine five 
times during the spring and autumn festivals, to which Beijing’s only objection was over 
the LDP rightist faction’s proposed legislation, not over the visits themselves. The 
Yasukuni Shrine bill, initiated in 1969, was submitted through both houses of the Diet for 
six consecutive years, but was ultimately defeated due to overwhelming domestic 
opposition. Beijing assiduously followed the bill’s developments but took no observable 
action with regards to Tanaka’s visits. One possible interpretation of this outcome is that 
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while Beijing frowned upon government sponsorship of Yasukuni, Beijing appreciated 
the economic incentives (such as bilateral agreements on trade and aviation and 
navigation in 1974, and a fisheries agreement in 1975) that came with cooperation with 
Japan as opposed to confrontation. Another interpretation is that Japanese prime ministers 
from Yoshida through Tanaka never visited the shrine in commemoration of the Pacific 
War—a trend that would soon change. 
6. Miki Takeo (1974–1976) 
Prime Minister Miki—a noted pro-China politician—visited Yasukuni three 
times, but, different from his predecessors, Miki’s 15 August 1975 visit made him the 
first prime minister to visit Yasukuni in honor of those Japanese who died in service 
during the Pacific War. Interestingly, Beijing ignored this visit. 
Despite Miki’s pro-China stance, relations between the two were strained mainly 
because of the Taiwan problem. On 5 April 1975, seventeen days before Miki’s 22 April 
1975 visit to Yasukuni, Chiang Kai-shek died. Miki’s public condolences over Chiang’s 
passing discredited him in Beijing’s eyes, and the situation was further exacerbated when 
Miki permitted Sato Eisaku to attend Chiang’s funeral in Taiwan. At the same time, 
Mao’s health was failing. One might expect Beijing to seize the opportunity to link 
Miki’s support to Taiwan to his Yasukuni visit, but, yet again, Beijing let it go. Mao’s 
death in September 1976 not only ended a critical period in PRC history, it also might 
explain why Beijing ignored Miki’s visits to Yasukuni.97 
B. DENG ERA YASUKUNI VISITS 
In the years following Mao’s death in 1976 up to 1989, four Japanese prime 
ministers visited Yasukuni 27 times. Of the 27 visits, Beijing ignored 23 of them  
(85 percent), responding only four times (two of which were very minimal responses) and 
not consecutively (demonstrating inconsistent behavior). These inconsistencies indicate 
that there is room for interpretation as to why Beijing ignored some visits while 
protesting others. Moreover, the evidence of increasing responses to a historically 
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significant event where there was none before suggests a shift from Mao’s historical 
narrative depicting China as a powerful, victorious nation unencumbered by past 
humiliation to one of victimization and confronting China’s painful past. By abandoning 
the once popular victor narrative under Mao in favor of a victimization narrative, the 
same Japanese provocations once tolerated became events that became increasingly 
harder for Beijing to ignore. 
1. Fukuda Takeo (1976–1978) 
Prime Minister Fukuda’s four visits to Yasukuni included one visit on the 
sensitive World War II anniversary, yet Beijing did not object to this or the other seasonal 
visits. The stalled normalization negotiations seemed to eclipse the Yasukuni debate. 
Coming out of the unfavorable state of Sino-Japanese relations under Miki, Fukuda 
sought a breakthrough in the normalization deadlock. Trade proved to be the tool of 
choice for Fukuda. 
On 16 February 1978, China and Japan concluded a Long-term (LT) Trade 
Agreement whereby both sides agreed to $20 billion in trade over eight years.98  Under 
the agreement China’s energy exports would grow and Japan would export equipment 
technology needed for Chinese industrialization.99  The LT trade agreement represented 
the type of economic enhancement initiatives Beijing both wanted and needed to 
implement its sought-after reforms. 
The highlight of Fukuda’s tenure as Japanese prime minister in Sino-Japanese 
relations was the conclusion of a peace treaty with the PRC that ended the state of war 
and normalized relations between the two countries. The Chinese proved to be shrewd 
negotiators, and the treaty reflected that reality by hooking Tokyo into the anti-hegemony 
clause (an implicit reference to Soviet expansion). In so doing, Tokyo lost all leverage 
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with Moscow in negotiating the return of the disputed Northern Territories.100  Fukuda, 
in an unsuccessful attempt to salvage relations with Moscow, demanded China agree to 
an article stating that the treaty would not constrain either party’s relations with third 
countries. China agreed, but the result was a lopsided treaty that favored China more than 
it did Japan. 
While the treaty represented a landmark advance in Sino-Japanese relationships 
(certainly an event of the magnitude that could obfuscate Fukuda’s visits to Yasukuni), 
history reveals a slight blemish on what was otherwise a successful and mutually 
beneficial treaty. On 17 October 1978— one day before the treaty was ratified—fourteen 
Class A war criminals were interred at Yasukuni.101  Though it is unlikely that Beijing 
knew of the war criminals’ interment as it happened (Japanese media made the war 
criminals’ enshrinement public knowledge in 1979), the event would be a dramatic 
turning point in the Yasukuni controversy years later, putting Beijing in a difficult 
position where ignoring visits would become increasingly more difficult. 
2. Ohira Masayoshi (1978–1980) 
Prime Minister Ohira paid three uneventful visits to Yasukuni during seasonal 
festivals. The first of which occurred in April 1979 during Deng Xiaoping’s 
consolidation of power from Hua Guafeng as China’s paramount leader. Perhaps more 
notable, however, is the Chinese security context in which this visit occurred. Two 
months earlier China was at war with Vietnam. The brief conflict lasted less than three 
weeks and demonstrated a lackluster performance on the part of the PLA, particularly 
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with regard to shortcomings in combined arms operations and command and control. To 
rectify this security gap, and the economy more broadly, Deng moved to advance the 
“four modernizations” initiative by soliciting help from Japan.102  Additionally, Deng 
requested Japanese low-interest loans and cooperation on developing China’s legal 
system to help manage the inflow of foreign capital funding these modernizations.103  
With such modernization progress riding on Japanese assistance, one can reasonably 
conclude that Beijing had ample incentive not to upset the status of Sino-Japanese 
relations over Yasukuni. 
3. Suzuki Zenko (1980–1982) 
Since becoming prime minister after Ohira’s sudden death, Suzuki Zenko visited 
Yasukuni nine times in just over two years—the most aggressive pattern at that time 
since 1951 with visits every spring, autumn, and August. No observable response from 
Beijing could be found for the first seven visits, which, when taken into account the two 
15 August visits, suggest that Beijing continued to have economic motivations to ignore 
the visits, such as the cooperative joint Baoshan steel mill venture. Japan would soon 
realize the risk of such joint ventures. 
In 1981, after years of construction and Japanese aid, Beijing unilaterally 
cancelled Baoshan steel mill contracts with Japan, worth ¥300 billion. The motivations 
for Beijing’s actions are not entirely clear, although some argue the decision was driven 
by Chinese fiscal constraints and bureaucratic dissatisfaction with the project.104  The 
“Baoshan shock” created an air of uncertainty in Japan about the prospects of trade with 
China, and even threatened the future of the LT trade agreement. To salvage investment, 
Japan provided China an additional ¥300 billion for Baoshan to resume. The implications 
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of Baoshan, and Sino-Japanese economic integration more broadly, indicate that the 
health of the economy was more important than historic controversy. 
The history issue took a turn on 26 June 1982 when Japanese media reported that 
the Japanese government had ordered revision of Japanese history textbooks in ways that 
diminished early 20th century Japanese Imperial Army conduct.105  The headlines drew 
quick condemnation from Beijing and Seoul.106  Chalmers Johnson argues that Beijing 
was not insulted over the textbook issue as much as it was an effort by Deng to divert 
attention away from Japan’s renewed ties to Taiwan—evidenced by the near 
simultaneous visit of the LDP’s Special Council for International Economic Policy to 
Taiwan. Twenty days later, on the sensitive date of 15 August, Suzuki visited Yasukuni. 
Suzuki’s Yasukuni visit would seem to have added welcome fuel to the diversionary fires 
as the visit preceded the twelfth CCP National Party Congress—the event for which 
Deng would come under fire from Party rivals about being soft on anything having to do 
with Taiwan. Beijing did respond, however, but minimally. While the People’s Daily ran 
a lengthy report on Yasukuni, it did not officially condemn Suzuki’s visit; rather, it 
questioned whether Japan had learned anything from World War II.107 
Notable, though, was that Xinhua reported that Suzuki had made the visit in an 
official capacity by signing the visitor’s book as “prime minister.”108  The official 
capacity of this visit is important because it challenges the conventional wisdom that 
Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s 1985 visit was the first official visit of a Japanese 
prime minister to Yasukuni. That there was no international outrage associated with 
Suzuki’s visit and attendant statements suggests that the visits themselves were not the 
problem and that Beijing manufactured the problem to suit its interests. 
Suzuki visited Yasukuni two months later in October. Beijing did not officially 
object to his visit, but the media seized upon another visit to the shrine to bring awareness 
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to the event. The Xinhua news agency reported that 139 Dietmen visited Yasukuni and 
that the Suzuki administration had deemed such visits might be in violation of Japan’s 
Constitution.109  While this report was minimal and did not even address Suzuki’s 18 
October 1982 visit, it did demonstrate the increasing awareness of Yasukuni in China, 
and, because of the timing of the Xinhua report, a link to Suzuki’s visit can be inferred, 
and so counts as an objection. 
4. Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982–1987) 
By the time Nakasone Yasuhiro succeeded Suzuki as prime minister, Japan had 
become an economic superpower (the second largest world economy since 1970), and 
Nakasone sought to raise Japan’s geopolitical role commensurate with its status. While 
such a stance might normally have come at the cost of improved relations with Beijing, 
Nakasone sought to improve relations with China, and Beijing was receptive.110  While 
Nakasone enhanced bilateral trade, however, he concomitantly stoked the embers of anti-
Japanese nationalism in China with his visits to Yasukuni. 
Initially Beijing seemed to be on a course to ignore Nakasone’s visits. Nakasone’s 
first visit was in April 1983, which occurred against a backdrop of improved Sino-
Japanese relations. In an interview with the People’s Daily, Nakasone stated, “Japan 
wants to establish firm scientific and cultural exchanges with China on the basis of 
mutual economic cooperation.”111  Nakasone’s visit in August, however, proved that 
Yasukuni would be a source of friction between the two states. 
Dating back to 1951, Nakasone’s 15 August 1983 visit was historic in that it was 
the first time Beijing, in no ambiguous language, condemned the Japanese prime minister 
for visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. The People’s Daily ran several headlines that criticized 
Nakasone’s visit. Beijing objected despite its ongoing $5 billion loan negotiations for the 
buildup of critical infrastructure, including port expansion and railway construction in 
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northern China and joint offshore oil exploration in the Bohai Sea.112  Loan negotiations 
carried through the next several years, which may have had in impact on Beijing’s 
decision to ignore Nakasone’s following seven visits to Yasukuni (October 1983 - April 
1985). The event suggests that the Yasukuni problem had evolved since the Mao years, 
because this marks the first time Beijing was willing to raise the history issue at the 
potential expense of considerable loans. 
Interestingly, on 10 August 1984 and ahead of his upcoming 15 August visit to 
Yasukuni, Nakasone commented to Japanese media, “I [Nakasone] will visit the Shrine 
[Yasukuni] on 15 August to commemorate the end of World War II. I will make the visit 
as ‘Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’ as before.”113  Following the visit, Xinhua 
reported on Nakasone’s visit and pointed out that Nakasone offered a ¥100,000 donation 
“in his capacity as prime minister.”114  Similar to Suzuki’s August 1982 visit, Nakasone 
explicitly stated that he made his visits to the shrine in an official capacity; yet no 
international outrage emerged in this instance. 
Nakasone’s last visit to the Yasukuni Shrine was on 15 August 1985—the 40th 
anniversary of the end of World War II. A day before the visit, the PRC Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) cautioned Tokyo that Nakasone’s visit would “hurt the feelings 
of the Chinese.”115  The warnings went unheeded, and after Nakasone’s visit thousands 
of Chinese students staged anti-Japanese protests in Beijing and Xian. The protests went 
on for days and seemed to have the regime’s support. Politburo member Hu Qili 
commented that the protests were “understandable,” and that he “did all kinds of (similar) 
things when [he] was young.”116  The visceral response in Beijing—criticisms from Deng 
Xiaoping, MOFA, the media, the CPPCC, and three days of student protests—convinced 
Nakasone not visit the shrine again. 
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Notable is the Chinese domestic and political context in which Nakasone’s visit 
occurred. In 1985, Japan was running an estimated $1 billion in trade surplus with 
China.117  The Chinese populace, insulted by Nakasone’s visit and perceived economic 
exploitation of a weaker country, charged that reliance on Japanese investment to fund 
China’s economic modernizations was akin to a Japanese “second invasion.”118  Hu 
Yaobang, then-CCP general secretary and advocate of friendly relations with Japan, used 
a soft domestic approach to the demonstrations, mixing minimum force and maximum 
persuasion to end the demonstrations, so as to avoid disruption to ongoing economic 
initiatives, such as Baoshan.119  In the international forum, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu 
Xueqian admonished Japan “not to go back to the old militarist road,” in an effort to 
appease Chinese audiences.120 
Protests continued through December 1985 before they were eventually 
squelched, but a door had been opened that the regime could not fully close. The PRC’s 
repression of anti-Japanese demonstrations led to a recurrence a year later, only in 1986 
the larger demonstrations focused more on China’s own political system than on Japan. 
Infuriated by the demonstrations, Deng ousted Hu from power, which in-turn had 
linkages to the 1989 student protests in Beijing.121  The 1985 visit and its resultant 
political repression earned Hu Yaobang the label of “pro-Japan faction” and set the 
precedent for future generations of Chinese leaders against taking a soft approach 
towards Japan.122 
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The extreme response from China to Nakasone’s 1985 visit likely received the 
attention it did because it coincided with the 40th anniversary of World War II—not from 
the official capacity of the visit, as other visits were clearly done in the same capacity. 
Additionally, the Class A war criminals added intensity to the complaint, rather than the 
basis for it. In response, Nakasone cancelled his planned autumn visit to Yasukuni, and 
any future visits as well. The next visit occurred eleven years later. 
C. POST-TIANANMEN YASUKUNI VISITS 
The Tiananmen massacre fundamentally altered the state-society social contract 
in China, and the ghosts of Tiananmen still haunt the regime by constraining Beijing’s 
foreign policy options whenever Japanese provocations arise. Japanese provocations hold 
significant potential to generate swells of anti-Japanese nationalism that can result in 
Chinese domestic unrest. Beijing, embracing this reality, controls the media and security 
forces in attempts to suppress public opinion in some cases and to mobilize it in others. 
Beijing’s 100 percent response pattern to Japanese prime minister visits to Yasukuni in 
the years following 1989 attests to this reality. Moreover, Chinese leaders in the 1990s 
and after have commanded less presence than the cult of personality of Chairman Mao or 
the paramount stature of Deng Xiaoping. Thus, one way to consolidate power is to 
reinvigorate history issues and generate popular animosity towards Japan. 
1. Hashimoto Ryotaro (1996–1998) 
Prime Minister Hashimoto visited Yasukuni but one time in the summer of 1996 
on his birthday. While his visit was in July, one might conclude that the visit was 
divorced from the tension that August visits generate.123  Beijing, however, drew no such 
distinction. The People’s Daily wrote a scathing critique of Hashimoto and Japanese 
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leaders who visited the shrine.124  Beijing’s response came on the heels of what was 
already a turbulent moment in the security picture of Northeast Asia: The March 1996 
Taiwan Straits crisis, the April 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security, and the 
July 1996 territorial dispute over the uninhabited islets in the East China Sea, known as 
Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese.125  
Hashimoto did not return to Yasukuni for the remainder of his term. For its part, 
the Beijing regime probably concluded that it had successfully pressured Hashimoto the 
same way it had done in 1985 with Nakasone. It would soon find out that pressure does 
not work on everyone. 
2. Koizumi Junichiro (2001–2006) 
Prime Minister Koizumi represented a new generation of revisionists in Japanese 
politics whose anti-China attitude was very popular amongst domestic audiences but 
quite unpopular with Chinese. A persistent source of friction between Koizumi and 
Beijing since before Koizumi was even elected was the issue of Yasukuni. Koizumi 
visited Yasukuni six times—once every year of his term. Beijing responded to each visit 
with official objections. 
In Beijing during 2001, the leadership had yet to transition from Jiang Zemin to 
Hu Jintao. Jiang, remembering the ghosts of Tiananmen, was keenly attuned to the power 
of nationalist public opinion and made efforts to mobilize that opinion against Japan. In 
contrast, Hu, not bringing the same anti-Japanese emotional baggage into the presidency, 
made cautious efforts to smooth over differences with Koizumi to harmonize bilateral 
relations while ensuring domestic stability.126  Koizumi was less accommodating. As 
mentioned in Chapter One, Beijing’s efforts to negotiate a less contentious visit to 
Yasukuni in 2001 failed, leaving few options but to lodge official protest in the 
                                                 
124 As reported in Xinhua in English, August 16, 1996, Open Source Center, accessed May 6, 2013, 
https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_0_0_43/content/Display/505389
. 
125 Sasajima, Masahiko, “Japan’s Domestic Politics and China Policymaking,” in An Alliance for 
Engagement: Building Cooperation in Security Relations with China, eds. Benjamin Self and Jeffrey 
Thompson (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2002), 84. 
126 Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 164, 177. 
 65
aftermath.127  Similar to 1996, the response was high on rhetoric but low on action. 
Beijing likely thought that by levying pressure in the same manner that it did during the 
tenure of Hashimoto and Nakasone, it could coerce Koizumi to refrain from future visits. 
Koizumi’s return to Yasukuni in April 2002, however, demonstrated that he was not 
going to be persuaded as his predecessors had been. Beijing again lodged an official 
protest in 2002, including a statement from the Foreign Ministry that the visit was “a 
mistake” and that it “damaged the political foundation of Sino-Japanese ties.”128 
Koizumi’s surprise visit in January 2003 invited similar heated polemics. Beijing 
was particularly critical of what it perceived as an attempt by Koizumi to avoid 
international observance by visiting in January.129  Despite Beijing’s condemnation of 
the visit, bilateral economic and diplomatic initiatives continued through the year, 
including two summits between Koizumi and Hu Jintao.130  
In 2004, Koizumi again visited in January, and again Beijing responded with an 
official protest. But this visit occurred during a downturn in bilateral relations, and it 
appeared to mark a shift in Chinese society’s acceptance of Beijing’s handling of the 
provocations. In August 2003, an unearthed Japanese chemical munition exploded in 
Qiqihar city, wounding 37.131  Then, in September, a sex scandal in Zuhai involving 
hundreds of Japanese businessmen and Chinese prostitutes stoked Chinese nationalist 
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embers when the media reported that the event occurred on the eve of the 72nd 
anniversary of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931.132  Taken together, all three 
events represent a steady deterioration in bilateral ties, which came to a boiling point the 
following year. 
Though Koizumi’s 2005 visit happened in October, the highpoint in tensions was 
months earlier in April, when anti-Japanese protests rocked Beijing and Shanghai. The 
proximate cause of the riots was Japan’s bid for permanent membership to the United 
Nations Security Council, but the tension had been steadily building, attributable to 
several factors, not least of which Koizumi’s continued visits to Yasukuni. The 
demonstrations went on for weeks before the regime stepped in and put a stop to them.133  
Months later, in October, Koizumi paid tribute at Yasukuni, to which the PRC Foreign 
Ministry stated, “The Chinese Government resolutely opposes Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
visit to Yasukuni Shrine.”134 
Koizumi’s last visit to the shrine was on 15 August 2006. Aware of his short time 
left in office, Koizumi felt no compunction about visiting on such a highly sensitive date, 
leaving any political fallout for his replacement to handle. President Hu Jintao lambasted 
Koizumi for this visit, along with the previous five, but more importantly, Hu used the 
occasion to sensitize the incoming Japanese leadership of the importance that China 
attaches to the Yasukuni problem and that improved bilateral ties were dependent upon 
Japan ceasing the visits. As of this writing, Koizumi was the last prime minister to visit 
Yasukuni. 
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D. ANALYSIS OF BEIJING’S RESPONSES 
1. Beijing’s Responses by the Numbers 
Of the 64 Japanese prime minister visits to Yasukuni, Beijing responded 11 times 
(17 percent) while ignoring the majority, 53 (83 percent). Broken down by the different 
periods used in this thesis, Mao ignored all thirty visits, Deng ignored 23 visits and 
responded four times, and the post-1989 leadership responded to each of the seven visits. 
Of the 11 responses, five were in response to visits during the sensitive month of August, 
which was the clear majority over any other month of the year (two in October, two in 
January, and one in April and July). Thus, if Beijing was going to react, the majority of 
the time it did so in response to August visits. 
2. Chinese Trends and Explanations 
From the preceding analysis, two periods of consistency emerge. First, Mao 
ignored every visit. Second, the post-1989 leaders responded to every visit. Deng 
Xiaoping represents the only era when Beijing was inconsistent in response to Yasukuni. 
Such a trend lends much credibility to the assertion that Mao, the founding dictator of the 
People’s Republic, had unchallenged authority on matters of foreign policy. After Mao, a 
trend suggestive of a lessening of the authority that Mao commanded emerges, evidenced 
in this case by several instances of government responses to Yasukuni under Deng and 
100 percent under leaders thereafter. 
The lingering question is what explains Beijing’s responses to Yasukuni?  
Scholarship cites two reasons that account for the reversal in Beijing’s approach to 
Yasukuni: either the inclusion of Class A war criminals or the official capacity of the 
visits. While these factors are important, perhaps the best explanation is one that does not 
stress either reason, but parses together changing domestic conditions in China with the 
evolution of changes in the Yasukuni problem. 
One interpretation of Beijing’s reversal from ignoring Yasukuni Shrine visits 
from 1950 to 1984 to actively protesting prime minister visits in 1985 focuses on the 
enshrinement of Class A war criminals and the symbol such visits represent toward 
honoring Japan’s imperialistic past. In this context, prior to 1978 Beijing largely ignored 
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shrine visits presumably because the visits did not present a serious agitation to Chinese 
historical memory by honoring those convicted of the most egregious war crimes. Given 
that neither Chinese political elites nor popular levels of Chinese society seemed to object 
when Class B and C war criminals were interred in 1959, one might conclude that the 
deification of 14 Class A war criminals—seven of which were executed while in Sugamo 
Prison—was the defining explanation for the fervent government protest witnessed in 
1985. Such an explanation, however, is less than compelling given that in April 1979 the 
media revealed the surreptitious interment of the Class A war criminals.135  Following 
April 1979 there were twenty-one prime minister visits to the Yasukuni Shrine that went 
by relatively unnoticed. If Beijing’s staunch protest of Yasukuni was because of the Class 
A war criminals, then why did Beijing silently endure over twenty prime minister visits 
to the shrine? 
Another explanation suggests that the vehement response in 1985 was not because 
of the enshrinement of 14 Class A war criminals, but rather because Prime Minister 
Nakasone Yasuhiro declared his visit in August 1985 to be official. During his visit, 
Nakasone included his title as prime minister in signing the Yasukuni guest book and 
paid for both the entrance fee and a wreath with state funds. In this context, Nakasone 
increased the level of provocation by linking the state of Japan to honoring war criminals 
in a way not previously seen. Beijing reacted to this subtle revisionist gesture rather than 
the visit itself. However, this explanation also falls short, given that Nakasone had visited 
the shrine nine times prior to August 1985 largely without incident and ignores Suzuki’s 
previous official visits. 
The most compelling explanation for why Beijing reacted in August 1985 in a 
way previously unseen takes a more systemic analysis inclusive of both arguments but 
also takes inventory of the changing political landscape of China. The changing of state 
leadership from Mao to Deng ushered in a new era of authoritarian rule, as previously 
outlined. Concurrently, the Yasukuni problem evolved into something more complex 
than it had been in previous decades, with the enshrinement of war criminals and 
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attention to the character of the visits themselves. Taken together, these three factors 
provide a compelling explanation for Beijing’s changing response to Yasukuni. 
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Using Yasukuni Shrine as a test case, the evidence of Beijing’s response seems to 
support Gries’s argument that Mao suppressed historical memory of Japanese 
imperialism to construct a new narrative of a powerful China rather than dwelling on its 
humiliating past. The combination of Mao’s death and the controversial enshrinement of 
Class A war criminals at Yasukuni contributed towards the shift away from suppression 
of public opinion regarding historical scores. Based on the Yasukuni trends, one might 
deduce a link between power and anti-Japanese rhetoric: The more powerful the regime’s 
central figure, the less likely the need to mobilize nationalistic sentiment. Though never 
formally holding the title of Party general secretary or state president, Deng was China’s 
paramount leader, and held considerable power over the Party and politics. His soft touch 
on foreign policy issues probably contributed towards improved China-Japan relations 
than existed under his protégés. Jiang Zemin, on the other hand, appeared weaker and 
struggled to consolidate power, oftentimes mobilizing anti-Japan nationalism to replace 
what he lacked in veteran revolutionary bona fides. Hu Jintao was not even considered 
China’s “core leader” as Jiang was and bilateral relations were terrible (to be fair, Prime 
Minister Koizumi was more provocative than his Japanese predecessors). The increasing 
responses to Yasukuni suggest that China’s post- Mao and Deng leaders may have a 
greater need to mobilize public sentiment against Japan. 
Beyond state leadership, China’s political system mattered in how the response to 
Yasukuni was administered. During the Mao years, political suppression of anti-Japanese 
nationalism was normal. The authoritarian setting under Mao was one of obedience to 
Party ideology. Regarding Japan, establishing and normalizing relations was the task at 
hand, so much so that war reparations were not even demanded. Under Deng, 
strengthening bilateral ties with Japan for economic benefits was the priority. The anti-
Japanese protests witnessed in 1985 seemed to be bottom-up social movements that 
challenged Party economic initiatives, and were thus suppressed. The inconsistencies 
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with Beijing’s responses during this period could have been a reflection of Deng’s 
broader policy volatility. The strong responses seen in 1996 and from 2001–2006 seemed 
to originate at the top, evidenced by the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations. 
Beijing’s responses to Yasukuni reveal much about authoritarian political 
systems: The government has greater latitude to respond or ignore public opinion in ways 
that would challenge a democracy. The South Korean case study affords observers the 




V. SEOUL’S RESPONSE TO JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER 
VISITS TO YASUKUNI 
The ROK offers a useful case study for this thesis as it provides a view into 
Seoul’s responses to Japanese prime minister visits to Yasukuni in both an authoritarian 
and a (transitional) democratic setting. This chapter measures Seoul’s public response to 
each of the 64 prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni and determines what patterns exist and 
why. Using the periods of ROK authoritarianism and transitional democracy, the study 
follows a chronology of Japan’s prime ministers to assess Seoul’s response to their visits 
to Yasukuni. 
Similar to Beijing, Seoul has both ignored Yasukuni visits and has lodged official 
objection to them. A key difference in the South Korean case study is that there were no 
periods of inconsistency in the responses. This chapter shows that prior to 1996, Seoul 
ignored all 57 visits, which encompassed the entirety of the ROK’s authoritarian 
governance. In 1996, Seoul reversed this pattern and began to voice its objection to 
Tokyo, and has consistently done so henceforth. 
A. AUTHORITARIAN SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO 
YASUKUNI  
Between 1951 and 1985, Japanese prime ministers visited the Yasukuni Shrine 57 
times. Seoul ignored all 57 visits. Absent any observable response or published policy 
with which to demonstrate Seoul’s position on the matter, one must look to the status of 
ROK-Japan relations to explain what might account for this pattern. The period of 
authoritarianism in the ROK spanned its beginnings as a sovereign state in 1948 to 1988. 
Seoul’s politics over this period were dominated by three figures: Rhee Syngman, Park 
Chung-hee, and Chun Doo-hwan. As Korea’s economy reached takeoff in the late 1970s, 
it looked to Japan as a model of economic success worthy of emulation. In this context, 
one might interpret Seoul’s response to Yasukuni as a conscious decision to focus on 
building its economy rather than settling historical grievances with Japan. Another 
plausible explanation might lie in the character, authority, and vision of the successive 
heads of state in regard to the need to mobilize anti-Japanese nationalism in pursuit of 
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national interests. The following analysis explores these interpretations and concludes 
that both have explanatory value. 
1. Yoshida Shigeru (1948–1954) 
At roughly the same time Prime Minister Yoshida was elected to his post, Rhee 
Syngman took control of the ROK. Seoul ignored Yoshida’s five Yasukuni visits, but one 
must consider the ROK’s domestic security context during which these visits occurred. 
Rhee presided over a country engaged in a brutal civil war and likely had little interest in 
protesting Yoshida’s Yasukuni visits in 1951, 1952, and April 1953. Yoshida’s visit in 
October 1953 was but months after the signing of the armistice agreement on 27 July 
1953. Not only was the security situation still very tenuous in the ROK, the country was 
broken from war. 
As the ROK moved on from the war, Rhee remained extremely distrustful of 
Japan and, as a result, adopted a hostile posture in his relations with Tokyo. Bilateral 
economic or political engagement can be characterized as minimal, consisting primarily 
of negotiations on the nationality and status of Koreans in Japan. Trade with Japan 
existed, consisting mostly of Japanese imports, but was relatively low compared to trade 
with the United States.136  Rhee’s non-responses to Yoshida’s visits to Yasukuni, 
however, seem driven less by economic enhancement opportunities, and more reflective 
of a choice to engage Japan on as little as possible. 
2. Kishi Nobusuke (1957–1960) 
In 1957, the ROK was importing nearly three times as much from Japan as it was 
exporting to Japan, likely because the ROK did not have much to export at the time.137  
The imbalance in imports to exports observed in 1957 laid the foundation of the ROK’s 
trade deficit with its neighbor. 
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Seoul ignored both of Prime Minister Kishi’s visits to Yasukuni, and, similar to 
Rhee’s relations with Japan under Yoshida, the decision was unlikely tied to trade. In 
April 1957, shortly after Kishi took office, there was a brief period during which tension 
in the bilateral relationship subsided. Rhee was willing to reopen the Japanese-Korean 
talks with Kishi (ahead of Kishi’s June visit to the United States) so long as Japan “does 
not change its sincere attitude.”138  The talks were scuttled, however, based on Seoul’s 
perception that Kishi negotiated $5 billion in loans from Washington for an Asian 
economic development fund that would expand Japanese trade in Southeast Asia.139 
By 1960, South Korean trade with Japan had increased to $91 million, nearly 
doubling 1957 levels.140  While economic cooperation existed, it is hard to conclude that 
Rhee’s decision to ignore Kishi’s Yasukuni visits was premised upon it. A more 
compelling interpretation is that Rhee desired as little contact as possible, even if it 
involved ignoring a historical slight. 
3. Ikeda Hayato (1960–1964) 
Four of Ikeda’s five visits to Yasukuni occurred during the turbulent Korean 
political transition between Rhee’s resignation in 1960 and Park Chung-hee’s 
consolidation of power in 1962. One could conclude that the Yasukuni issue was lost in 
the political turmoil. The first visit that Park could have presumably challenged was 
Ikeda’s 1963 visit. Park’s determination to mend relations with Japan early in his tenure, 
however, suggests that he would have ignored the Yasukuni controversy. 
4. Sato Eisaku (1964–1972) 
Park’s incentive to ignore Yasukuni continued into Prime Minister Sato’s term. 
All eleven of Sato’s visits were ignored, but important to note is the context that 
normalization of relations had on South Korean public opinion. 
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Japan and the ROK concluded diplomatic recognition and normalization on 22 
June 1965. While normalization was a crucial component of Park’s vision for South 
Korea’s economic future, the Korean populace reacted harshly at what it perceived as 
being betrayed by its own government. The ensuing Korean demonstrations and resultant 
forceful response set the precedent for state-society relations. In so doing, Park made it 
clear that there were limits to public dissent, and exceeding those limits could result in 
forceful response. Park’s brutal suppression also demonstrated the importance he 
attached to the ROK’s relations with Japan. In this context, it is reasonable to conclude 
that even if South Korean society was aware of Sato’s subsequent ten visits to Yasukuni, 
Park’s violent political suppression in 1965 ensured that public opinion did not guide 
policy nor challenge the regime. 
The economic benefits of Park’s decision to normalize relations with Japan were 
quickly realized. In 1966, Japan eclipsed the United States as the ROK’s largest trading 
partner.141  The Yasukuni problem was likely dismissed not only because of the domestic 
unrest it might generate within the ROK, but mobilizing public opinion against Japan 
could have also jeopardized the economic cooperation the ROK enjoyed with Japan. The 
amicable relationship between the two countries, however, was about to change. 
5. Tanaka Kakuei (1972–1974) 
In 1973 and 1974, two events strained bilateral ties nearly to the breaking point: 
(1) the 1973 kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung from a Tokyo hotel, and (2) the 1974 
assassination attempt of President Park by a Korean resident of Japan.142  But changes in 
the ROK’s political winds and the effects of the recalibrating Cold War strategic 
realignment in the early 1970s shaped Korea’s domestic environment that set the stage 
for contention years before either event occurred. 
Under the South Korean Constitution at the time, there were term limits on the 
presidency, which drove the need for elections (despite their perfunctory nature). The 
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outcome of the 1971 South Korean national elections, however, was unexpected and 
shocked the regime. While Park defeated opposition leader Kim Dae-jung, he did so only 
by a narrow margin (9 percent). Park’s near defeat at the elections caused him to take 
inventory of his political power, and he began to explore ways to strengthen the 
presidency. 
Contemporaneously, the tectonic shifts in the geopolitical landscape produced by 
the Nixon doctrine and Nixon shocks caused Park to question the commitment of the 
United States to the defense of South Korea. In a move to hedge against abandonment by 
the United States, Park hastily established a dialogue with North Korea, and in May 
1972, Seoul and Pyongyang leaders met in Pyongyang and agreed on the principles of 
reunification.143  The agreement failed to produce any real improvement in South 
Korea’s security, which, when combined with rising political opposition, caused Park to 
declare a state of martial law in October 1972.144 
In November, Park drafted a new constitution (known as the Yushin Constitution) 
that, according to Bruce Cummings, granted him unlimited tenure in office and gave him 
“powers to appoint and dismiss the cabinet and even the prime minister, to designate one-
third of the National Assembly, to suspend or destroy civil liberties, and to issue decrees 
for whatever powers the Yushin framers forgot to include.”145  Upon hearing of Seoul’s 
dramatic authoritarian thrust, Kim Dae-jung (who by this time had fled to Japan to avoid 
imprisonment) denounced Park’s actions and attempted to rally support against him.146 
On 8 August 1973, Kim was kidnapped from his hotel room in Tokyo and was 
held for five days before being released near his home in Seoul.147  Kim’s kidnapping 
caused an international uproar, leaving Japan angry and embarrassed because its 
sovereignty had been violated. The incident ended with Seoul agreeing to Kim’s freedom 
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from prosecution for actions taken while in Japan, and Tokyo, in return, agreed to drop 
the issue. But the incident caused a row between the two countries that would resurface 
time and again over the next decade. 
The second event that strained bilateral ties occurred in August 1974 with the 
assassination attempt on Park Chung-hee. On 15 August, Mun Se-gwang, a second-
generation Korean living in Osaka, Japan, attempted to kill Park during a speech 
commemorating Korea’s liberation from Japan. Park survived the incident unharmed, but 
his wife, Yuk Young-soo, died from a stray bullet. From Seoul’s perspective, Tokyo was 
to blame because Mun was a permanent Japanese resident who went to the ROK under a 
forged Japanese passport with false Japanese identity and killed Yuk with a stolen police 
pistol from Osaka. Tokyo’s rejoinder was that Mun was Korean, and the visa that he 
entered Korea on was issued from the Korean consulate. The situation was defused after 
U.S. mediation, and Tokyo offered two statements of regret, one written and one oral.148 
Either the kidnapping or the assassination attempt would have been enough to 
disrupt ROK-Japanese relations had economic ties not been as strong as they were (Japan 
became the ROK’s largest trading partner in 1966)149  Despite the heated exchanges over 
both incidents, Seoul did not elevate Yasukuni as a problem. Timing could explain this 
outcome: both the kidnapping and the assassination attempt occurred in August, and there 
were no Yasukuni visits in August either year. 
The most compelling explanation why Seoul might have raised Yasukuni during 
Tanaka’s prime ministership would be in response to his April 1974 visit. During a 
speech he gave to the Diet on 24 January 1974, Tanaka commented that the Japanese 
occupation of Korea had brought “spiritual benefits” to Koreans.150  Seoul lodged official 
objection to Japan, and Tanaka—suddenly on the defensive—denied having made the 
comment.151  That Seoul protested Tanaka’s comment but ignored his Yasukuni visit two 
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months later suggests that Yasukuni did not carry the same significance as the overt 
reference to the occupation; otherwise Seoul would have objected Yasukuni. The 
significance of this example is that Korea observers could cite this event as evidence that 
Seoul manufactured the Yasukuni controversy for political purposes. 
6. Miki Takeo (1974–1976) 
Relations with Seoul improved under Prime Minister Miki, despite continued 
strain from both the kidnapping and assassination attempt (Tokyo pressed for results from 
the investigation into the Kim Dae-jung affair while Seoul sought an investigation from 
Japan on Mun’s background). Politically, Tokyo expressed intent to refrain from 
providing financial support to North Korea at Seoul’s request (though Seoul remained 
skeptical of Tokyo’s ties with Pyongyang), the ROK released two Japanese nationals 
from prison, and both governments collaborated on a response to the communization of 
Indochina.152  Economically, trade continued to flourish, increasing 25 percent in 1975 
and 65 percent in 1976 from 1973 levels.153 
In that context, Seoul ignored all three of Miki’s Yasukuni visits, including the 
historic 15 August visit in 1975. The security concerns of communist expansion shared 
by both Seoul and Tokyo in the wake of the unification of Vietnam, together with 
presidential candidate Jimmy Carter’s campaign pronouncement to remove all ground 
forces from Korea, likely gave impetus to deal with the larger security concerns ahead of 
lingering historical animosities.154 
7. Fukuda Takeo (1976–1978) 
In 1977, an unresolved territorial dispute over an isolated pair of islets in the Sea 
of Japan flared, raising bilateral tension amid growing uncertainty in the Northeast Asian 
security situation rooted in President Carter’s plan to withdraw United States ground 
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forces from Korea. Dokdo, or Takeshima in Japan (henceforth referred to as Dokdo), 
belonged to Korea prior to 1905, but was claimed by Japan after the Russo-Japanese War 
and subsequent Korean subjugation. After its surrender in World War II, Japan lost 
claims to the territory it annexed during the Meiji era, including Dokdo. The San 
Francisco treaty, however, left the Dokdo issue unclear, such that it has been in dispute 
ever since. 
The earliest report of political dispute regarding Dokdo dates back to 1956 under 
Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro (who never visited Yasukuni).155  The Dokdo dispute 
erupted in February 1977 when Fukuda made a statement to the Diet that Dokdo 
belonged to Japan.156  Tensions increased when Seoul charged that Japan had violated air 
space over Dokdo later that month.157  The Dokdo controversy discolored bilateral 
relations for the remainder of Fukuda’s tenure, culminating in calls by the ROK National 
Assembly to fortify the island (which the ROK government did, building a police facility 
and observatory station on the island) and Tokyo’s decision to suspend 4 million yen in 
public loans (which were resumed in July 1978).158  While Dokdo served as an irritant in 
bilateral ties, given that Fukuda visited Yasukuni in both April and August 1977, one 
might expect Seoul to protest against Japanese claims over Dokdo by linking it to 
Yasukuni and the occupation more broadly. But it did not, yet. 
8. Ohira Masayoshi (1978–1980) 
Prime Minister Ohira visited Yasukuni four months after replacing Fukuda in 
December 1978. Interestingly, rather than object to the visit, ROK Premier and founder 
of the KCIA, Kim Chong-pil, paid a courtesy call to Ohira on 27 April, one week after 
Ohira’s visit to Yasukuni. Kim expressed Seoul’s desire to continue amicable relations 
with Japan, to which Ohira proclaimed there would be no change in Tokyo’s Korea 
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policy. Yasukuni was curiously absent from the agenda, which suggests that building 
healthy relations with the new administration took priority over Yasukuni.159 
Seoul and Tokyo continued to cooperate on security issues under Ohira, 
evidenced by the joint claims by both governments for Washington to halt its force 
reduction in the ROK. In 1979, President Carter reversed his 1977 decision to withdraw 
troops, thus assuaging Seoul’s fears of the sudden withdrawal of U.S. forces.160 
Ties between the two countries remained stable despite the political turmoil 
following Park Chung-hee’s assassination. Former Prime Minister Kishi attended Park’s 
funeral as the special envoy for Japan.161  Amicable Japan-South Korean ties were 
disrupted in May 1980, however, following Chun Doo-hwan’s military crackdown in 
Kwangju. The main opposition party in Japan, the Japan Socialist Party, used the incident 
to pressure the LDP to break political and economic ties with the ROK government. 
Additionally, Chun’s attribution of the Kwangju rebellion to Kim Dae-jung agitated the 
Japanese public (linking Kwangju back to Kim’s kidnapping).162  The Ohira 
administration was reluctant to take sides in the affair and, unintentionally, left the 
inevitable aftermath for his successor to settle. 
9. Suzuki Zenko (1980–1982) 
Prime Minister Suzuki inherited the fallout from Kwangju and the resultant 
persecution of Kim Dae-jung after Ohira’s sudden death. Bilateral ties became quite 
strained when Suzuki—in response to Kim’s conviction and death sentence in July—
threatened to suspend financial support to Seoul. Suzuki’s comments were reported in 
Korean media, which ignited anti-Japanese protests in Seoul. The Kim saga carried on 
into 1981 before intervention by President Ronald Reagan diffused the tension. 
Meanwhile, Suzuki visited Yasukuni several times, including a mid-August visit. In the 
midst of the ongoing political upheaval of Chun’s consolidation of power and attendant 
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political suppression, perhaps Yasukuni was not at the forefront of the regime’s 
agenda.163 
Though the remainder of Suzuki’s Yasukuni visits were ignored, there were two 
significant issues that developed in 1981–1982 that merit special attention. First, Seoul 
requested considerable loans from Japan to boost its ailing economy. In 1981, the Korean 
economy was climbing out of the worst slump in twenty years and inflation was rampant. 
Chun needed an economic stimulus and, in August 1981, sought $6 billion in loans from 
Japan. The contentious loan negotiations carried on for years, both because of suspicion 
on the Japanese side that they were tied to the 1965 war reparations and the attendant 
anti-Korean political climate in Japan that the Kwangju massacre and Kim Dae-jung 
affair rekindled.164 
The second issue complicating ROK-Japan ties was Tokyo’s revision of Japanese 
history textbooks in June 1982. Similar to the response in China, a wave of anti-Japanese 
fervor swept over South Korea, including ROK government denouncement of Japan’s 
actions. The heightened anti-Japanese nationalism continued for months, culminating at 
the 37th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japan on 15 August 1982. As part of the 
occasion, Chun Doo-hwan delivered a commemoration speech highlighting Korean 
suffering by the Japanese during the colonization period. According to Lee Chong-sik, 
Chun’s speech was notable because it was the first time a ROK president acknowledged 
South Korea’s past weakness as contributing towards its subjugation.165  Perhaps more 
important was the impact Chun’s words had on Korean society. Lee notes the effects of 
Chun’s speech: “Not even a dictatorial government could contain the strong emotions 
aroused among the Korean people.”166  On the same day, Suzuki paid tribute at 
Yasukuni, but the event received no official protests like the textbooks did. 
The events of 1981 and 1982 are revealing with regard to Seoul’s approach to 
Yasukuni and the history problem in general. Regarding the ROK’s motivation to ignore 
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Suzuki’s Yasukuni visits, logic points to the $6 billion loan request. What incentive did 
Chun have to make an issue out of Yasukuni and potentially jeopardize badly needed 
foreign capital over an issue that previously did not merit attention?  By shielding the 
ROK’s loan request from historical grievances, Chun was able avoid the historical 
entanglement that Yasukuni would have brought to the contentious loan negotiations. 
On the other hand, the economic argument is weakened by the official protests 
Seoul lodged with Tokyo over the textbook issue. In the midst of the turbulent loan 
negotiations, Seoul objected to the textbooks, presumably knowing that such objections 
might reflect in Tokyo’s decision on the amount and terms of the loan, which Seoul had 
yet to receive. 
The textbook controversy is very important in interpreting Seoul’s approach to 
Yasukuni. Chun’s 1982 anti-Japanese campaign reached its zenith in August, coinciding 
with Suzuki’s visit to Yasukuni. If Chun aimed to mobilize anti-Japanese nationalism, 
why did he ignore Suzuki’s visit?  One might expect Chun to seize upon an easy target—
Suzuki’s visit—to fuel his rhetorical campaign. Based on the outcome of the 1982 
textbook issue, observers might conclude two things: (1) Not all history issues are equal; 
and (2) economic enhancement initiatives, in and of themselves, cannot outweigh history. 
10. Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982–1987) 
After Suzuki completed his term (he did not seek reelection), Prime Minister 
Nakasone ushered in a new era in Japan-ROK relations. Economically, he took decisive 
action to settle the stalled loan negotiations. Japan agreed to and the ROK accepted a 
$4 billion loan over seven years, which boosted Seoul’s credit rating and stimulated 
economic recovery.167  The years following 1982 saw pleasant economic exchanges that 
were necessary for the implementation of the loans. 
Bilateral ties were also improving politically. Nakasone visited Seoul in January 
1983, and in 1984 Chun reciprocated and visited Tokyo (a historic first for any ROK 
                                                 
167 Ibid., 131. 
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president).168  During Chun’s visit, Nakasone hosted a luncheon on behalf of the visiting 
president, and commented, “There was a period in this century when Japan brought to 
bear great sufferings upon your country and its people. I would like to state here that the 
government and people of Japan feel a deep regret for the error and are determined to 
firmly warn ourselves for the future.”169  The joint communiqué produced at the end of 
the summit detailed various economic, political, and security initiatives both governments 
would work in concert to achieve, but did not make mention of regret over Nakasone’s 
visits to Yasukuni, or to the history issue more broadly. 
Despite significant improvements in bilateral ties, Nakasone visited the shrine 
several times, including mid-August visits in 1983, 1984, and 1985. None of the visits 
elicited a response from Seoul. Yasukuni was not mentioned even during Chun’s speech 
commemorating the 40th anniversary of liberation from Japan. The lack of a response to 
Yasukuni during any of these years suggests that, given China’s heated responses to the 
same events and Chun’s active promotion of anti-Japanese rhetoric in 1982, Chun was 
willing to ignore Yasukuni to seize upon the economic benefits Nakasone was providing. 
Chun’s tenure as president ended in 1988, making him the last South Korean 
president to ignore a Japanese prime minister visit to Yasukuni as of this writing. Roh 
Tae-woo would usher in a new era of Korean politics, and with it a new response pattern 
to Yasukuni. 
B. TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACY SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSES TO YASUKUNI  
After the transition to democracy in 1988, two Japanese prime ministers visited 
Yasukuni a total of seven times, and Seoul protested every time. The dramatic reversal of 
100 percent non-response to 100 percent protest suggests that the shift to democracy 
played a role in that phenomenon, but could also be attributed to economic development, 
too. 
                                                 
168 Korean opposition groups criticized Chun’s visit to Tokyo on the grounds that it solidified 
Japanese economic exploitation of the ROK. 
169 Kyodo in English, September 7, 1984, in FBIS Asia, September 7, 1984, C5. 
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1. Hashimoto Ryotaro (1996–1998) 
The Dokdo dispute flared in early 1996 and Tokyo, despite the usual polemics 
from both governments, did not recalibrate its approach to Yasukuni. Against the 
backdrop of renewed Dokdo claims and the return of the LDP to power, Hashimoto’s 
visit on his birthday in July 1996 marked the first time Seoul lodged official protest to the 
event (contrary to Shibuichi Daiki’s argument that Seoul first objected to Yasukuni in 
2001). Seoul’s response seems to have preempted public opinion in this case, evidenced 
by its official objection to Hashimoto’s visit, which was ahead of Korean media 
reporting. The ROK government, stating its position on the matter, commented, “In order 
to build sincere and friendly relations between Japan and Korea it is necessary to respect 
the feelings of countries which were victims of the attacks by imperialist Japan in the 
past.”170  The Korean media echoed the government’s response ten days later. In an 
editorial lambasting Japanese chief cabinet secretary Kajiyama Seiiroku, the Hanguk 
Daily criticized the Japanese rightist trend, stating, “The absurd assertion of Tok-to 
[Dokdo] belonging to Japan, Prime Minister Hashimoto’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine, and 
Kajiyama’s remarks are all of the same vein.”171  Here, for the first observed time, the 
linkages of Yasukuni to other lingering historical friction points became clear and should 
have forewarned Tokyo of a changing political trend in the ROK. 
2. Koizumi Junichiro (2001–2006) 
Prime Ministers Obuchi Keizo (1998–2000) and Mori Yoshiro (200–2001) 
heeded South Korea’s warnings, but Koizumi Junichiro ignored them and visited 
Yasukuni six times. In response, Seoul objected to all six of Koizumi’s visits with 
steadily increasing levels of rhetoric and action. The ROK government expressed “deep 
regret” over all six of Koizumi’s visits. In 2004, the ROK Foreign Ministry went a step 
further, strongly urging Koizumi not to visit the shrine again. After Koizumi’s 2005 visit, 
ROK Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon stated that the single biggest obstacle in ROK-Japan 
                                                 
170 The Digital Chosun Ilbo in English, July 30, 1996, in FBIS Asia, July 31, 1996, 38. 
171 Hanguk Ilbo, August 10, 1996, in FBIS Asia, August 12, 1996, 48. Kajiyama’s comments were in 
reference to the potential for renewed Korean war reparations demands from Japan following reunification 
of the Korean peninsula and withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. 
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relations was Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni. Moreover, Cheong Wa Dae (the ROK 
presidential office) threatened to—and did—cancel the December 2005 presidential 
summit in retaliation.172  Following Koizumi’s 2006 visit, Seoul continued to suspend 
summits with Tokyo and threatened to freeze the suspension should Koizumi’s successor 
follow in his footsteps.173 
After Koizumi left office, Tokyo reassessed its approach to relations with its 
neighbors vis-à-vis Yasukuni. As of this writing, no prime minister has since visited the 
shrine. 
C. ANALYSIS OF SEOUL’S RESPONSES 
1. Seoul’s Responses by the Numbers 
Of the 64 visits to Yasukuni, Seoul ignored 57 (89 percent) and responded to 
seven (11 percent). The breakout of totals by the periods used in this thesis is 
straightforward: Seoul’s authoritarian government ignored every visit while its 
transitional democracy responded to every visit. Of the seven responses, two were in 
response to August visits (29 percent), two to January visits, and one each in April, July, 
and October. By this account, Seoul was as likely to respond to January visits as much as 
August visits. While it can be said that Seoul is most responsive to August visits, such a 
                                                 
172 Yonhap in English, October 17, 2005, in Open Source Center, accessed May 21, 2013, 
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random pattern of responses suggests the timing of the visits mattered less than the visits 
themselves. 
2. South Korean Trends and Explanations 
A possible explanation for the trend of ignoring Yasukuni up to 1996 lies in its 
political system. When Park Chung-hee seized power in 1961 he put the ROK on an 
authoritarian trajectory that lasted until 1988. One of the many hallmarks of an 
authoritarian state is its ability to steer public opinion, either through fear, repression, 
coercion, or information dominance. Park’s Korea, similar to Mao’s China, can be 
characterized as intolerant of public protests over Japan, or at a minimum dismissive of 
efforts aimed at harassing Japan (whose economic assistance the ROK relied on, 
evidenced by Park’s determination for diplomatic normalization in 1965). Perhaps 
Park—whose rise to power was nurtured by the Imperial Japanese Army during the 
occupation—anticipated the economic benefits that improved bilateral relations with 
Japan could bring, and made the conscious decision to pursue growth and development 
rather than dwell on historical animosities. In this context, Park leveraged the power of 
his office to direct Korea towards industrialization and economic development while 
minimizing the historical distractions that beset Korea’s relations with Japan. 
The ROK’s authoritarian political system did not stop with Park’s assassination in 
1979, but rather continued under Chun Doo-hwan. Chun was challenged to consolidate 
his power early in his tenure and tended to be unsympathetic to public demand for 
political change, as is evident by his stamping out of any opposition movement such as 
that in Kwangju in 1980. Considering that Chun wielded significantly less power than his 
predecessor, one might expect Chun to seize upon anti-Japanese nationalism as a vehicle 
to help him consolidate power. If this is true, the nearly twenty shrine visits between 
Prime Ministers Suzuki and Nakasone provided Chun ample opportunity to do so. Yet, 
even during the highly controversial visit in 1985, Seoul did not register official 
complaint like Beijing did. Given the lack of any observable response, the political 
system comes to the fore, again, and presents a case of interests over honor. 
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By 1985 the ROK was the world’s twentieth largest economy—an impressive 
recovery from the state of economic ruin in 1953—but still far behind Japan. To 
stimulate continued growth, Chun pursued loans from Japan, the receipt of which having 
direct implications on Chun’s motivations for repressing anti-Japanese nationalism in 
general (notwithstanding the acute and unanticipated textbook controversy), and 
specifically with regard to Nakasone’s visits to Yasukuni. 
After Beijing lambasted Tokyo in the press over Prime Minister Nakasone’s 
1985 visit to the shrine, it would be 11 years before another Japanese prime minister paid 
homage at Yasukuni, and it would mark the first time Seoul registered an official 
objection to a visit to the shrine. 
In the context of a democratizing society, political systems appear to have some 
bearing on anti-Japanese nationalism because the government felt compelled to be 
responsive to public opinion in a manner different from the previous decades. While 
many changes happened in Korea socially and politically over the course of the eleven 
years between Nakasone and Hashimoto’s visits to Yasukuni, one significant and 
undeniable development was a transition from authoritarianism to transitional democracy. 
Another interpretation lies in the level of the ROK’s economic development in 
1996 compared to previous decades. Throughout Park and Chun’s tenure, the ROK  
was highly dependent upon Japanese financing. As that dependency gradually decreased, 
so too did Seoul’s trepidation of challenging Japanese historical provocations. By 1996, 
after annual growth rates of 9.7 percent since 1965, Seoul had become a high-income 
economy no longer dependent upon Japan as it once was.174  Similar to the PRC 
experience, economic independence from Japan emboldened the ROK to face its past and 
confront Japan on historical slights. In this context, the transition to democracy made the 
government more responsive to public opinion, but the ROK’s economic prowess 
sparked the confidence to challenge Japan’s policy on prime minister visits to Yasukuni. 
                                                 
174 From 1965 to 1980 the ROK experienced average annual growth in real gross domestic product at 
9.9 percent; from 1980–1993, the figure declined slightly to 9.7 percent. See Kosai Yutaka and Takeuchi 
Fumihide, “Japan’s Influence on the East Asian Economies,” in Behind East Asian Growth: The Political 
and Social Foundations of Prosperity, ed. Henry Rowen (New York: Routledge, 1998), 299.  
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D. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Coming out of the early 1950s, South Korea faced the considerable challenge of 
rebuilding its war-torn economy, and it needed Japan’s help to accomplish the task. In 
pursuit of this goal, the ROK’s authoritarian leaders used their dictatorial power to 
implement economic and fiscal policies that would improve South Korea’s economic and 
security standing. The post-authoritarian order saw a reversal in Seoul’s approach to 
Japanese provocations, likely because the ROK’s economical standing allowed it to 
challenge Japan without jeopardizing its own national interests. 
The non-response pattern observed over Korea’s authoritarian period might 
suggest that the Yasukuni controversy did not resonate with Koreans, but such a 
conclusion ignores the linkages the symbolism Yasukuni represents to Korean suffering 
at the hands of early 20th century Japan. Koreans have not forgotten the Japanese 
occupation or its attendant humiliation and anguish, and to associate governmental 
disregard of Yasukuni visits with indifference to history would be unwise. The textbook 
controversy, the Dokdo territorial dispute, and references to the occupation more broadly 
demonstrate Seoul’s recognition of historical grievances and its relentless pursuit to hold 
Japan accountable for its past actions. 
Seoul’s response to Yasukuni reveals much about the impact of political systems 
on anti-Japanese nationalism within a given state. The switch from authoritarianism to 
democracy brought with it a complete reversal in the government’s approach to 
Yasukuni. Seoul’s experience suggests that political systems have some impact on 
mobilizing nationalism: under the authoritarian banner, Seoul ignored Yasukuni; in a 
democratic setting, Seoul responded. What happens when Seoul’s response is compared 
to Beijing’s?  To such an analysis the study now turns. 
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VI. COMPARING POLITICAL SYSTEMS: SIMILARITIES AND 
DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSE TO YASUKUNI 
At this point in the study, both governments’ responses to Yasukuni from 1951 to 
present have been explored and analyzed to explain observed outcomes. The purpose of 
this chapter is to compare the responses in Beijing and Seoul to each other to assess the 
impact political systems had on their responses. The argument advanced in this chapter, 
and the thesis itself, is that the difference in political system had little impact on the 
responses either government took to Japanese prime minister visits to the Yasukuni 
Shrine. 
Of the 64 shrine visits, the majority (57; 90 percent) occurred during periods of 
authoritarian governance in both the PRC and ROK. Of these 57 events, similar 
responses were observed 53 times (93 percent), leaving four responses that differed 
(seven percent). Moreover, seven visits occurred during the ROK’s transition to 
democracy, of which both governments responded similarly. The preponderance of 
responses being similar during periods of authoritarian rule, together with 100 percent 
similar responses from both governments after the ROK transitioned to democracy, 
supports the argument that the difference in political systems had little impact on the 
responses either government took to Japanese prime minister visits to the Yasukuni 
Shrine. The following comparison reviews the similarities and differences in 
governmental responses and offers additional comparisons and perspectives on the 
nuanced issues in the Yasukuni controversy. 
A. SIMILARITIES: POLITICAL SYSTEM HAD MINIMAL IMPACT 
The comparison criteria used in this study included two primary categories— 
similar and different—with a secondary category of ignoring a visit or lodging official 
protest. This section of the chapter focuses on the instances where both governments 
behaved similarly—meaning both governments either ignored or protested a given visit. 
The implications of similarities on the study are that similarities suggest that the 
difference in political system had minimal impact on governmental behavior. 
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Of the 64 visits to Yasukuni Shrine, similar responses were observed on sixty 
occasions (93 percent). With over ninety percent of the total number of visits falling into 
this category, one could reasonably conclude that the difference in political system had 
little impact on both governments’ approach to Yasukuni. A review of the patterns 
reveals why this is so. 
1. Similar-Ignore 
Of the sixty similar responses, 53 occurrences (88 percent) resulted in both 
governments ignoring the visit. Additionally, from 1951 through 1982, both governments 
consistently ignored prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni, accounting for 45 events. After 
1982, eight events revealed the same response, though those were dispersed amongst 
different responses, and thus inconsistent. Notable in this period is that both governments 
were authoritarian. 
2. Similar-Protest 
From Hashimoto’s visit in 1996 up to present day, Beijing and Seoul responded to 
each visit with official protest (seven occurrences, or 12 percent of all similar responses). 
Notable is that all visits from 1996 forward occurred while the ROK was democratizing 
(the PRC remained authoritarian). The fact that a transitional democracy behaved 
similarly to an authoritarian regime is of paramount importance to this study, for it is the 
strongest evidence suggesting that the difference in political system had little impact on 
governmental response to Yasukuni. The total number of similar responses (sixty) makes 
for a strong argument, but more telling is the similarities between two different political 
systems. 
B. DIFFERENCES: POLITICAL SYSTEM HAD SIGNIFICANT IMPACT 
Differences in governmental response to Yasukuni suggest that the two 
governments behaved differently to the same stimulus, and therefore the difference in 
political system may be said to have had a significant impact on governmental response. 
Evidence reveals that only a small percentage (seven) of the whole registered different 
responses. As such, the findings were not statistically significant to conclude that political 
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systems impacted governmental behavior. Regarding the categories of differences, while 
the possibility existed of having cases where one government protested and the other 
ignored, and vice versa, evidence demonstrated only one pattern of different responses: 
Beijing protested while Seoul ignored. 
Of the 64 visits, Beijing and Seoul differed in their response on four occasions. 
The four events demonstrated the aforementioned pattern and occurred in August 1982, 
October 1982, August 1983, and August 1985. Suzuki’s August 1982 visit marked the 
first time a Japanese prime minister visited in an official capacity, and it was the first 
time Beijing objected to a Japanese prime ministerial visit. Two months later in October, 
Prime Minister Suzuki visited along with 139 Dietmen, to which Beijing protested. In 
August 1983, Beijing criticized Nakasone, and again two years later on what would 
become the most well-known of all Yasukuni visits. Seoul remained quiet on each of 
these events.175 
C. POLITICIZATION TOPICS: FACT OR FICTION? 
Two issues that merit special attention in this chapter—the war criminals’ 
enshrinement and the capacity of prime ministerial visits—are relevant to the discussion 
and lend themselves well to a comparison. Specifically, comparing Beijing and Seoul’s 
objections to Yasukuni can be revealing in assessing the validity of Tokyo’s claim that 
both governments manufacture the Yasukuni controversy for political reasons. 
Understanding how and why these two issues impacted governmental response can also 
help observers explain the timing of each government’s decision to respond negatively to 
Yasukuni. 
1. War Criminals 
The topic of the 14 Class A war criminals secretly enshrined at Yasukuni in 1978 
has been at the forefront of official objections coming out of Beijing and Seoul since 
1982. Presuming that both Beijing and Seoul knew about the enshrinement in 1979 
                                                 
 175 Seoul responded to other historically significant events over the same time period, such as 
Japanese history textbook revisions or Tokyo references to the occupation, but not specifically to Yasukuni. 
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allows certain conclusions to be drawn. Beijing’s first official objection to Yasukuni was 
in August 1982, and a central theme of its criticism focused on the war criminals. With 
the exception of October 1982, all of Beijing’s official protests cite the war criminals as a 
principle reason why Japanese prime ministers should not visit the shrine. The problem is 
that there was a delay from the time that the media revealed the enshrinement in 1979 and 
the first official objection to Yasukuni in 1982. In that three-year period, Japanese prime 
ministers visited ten times without incident. 
Seoul’s case is even more egregious. The first time that Seoul mentioned the war 
criminals was in its 1996 complaint. Between April 1979 and July 1996, Japanese prime 
ministers visited the shrine 22 times over a period of 17 years without offending Seoul. 
On the other hand, Seoul mentioned their enshrinement with each official protest. 
Regarding the validity of Tokyo’s assertion that its neighbors manufactured the 
war criminals problem for political gain, the years and numbers of shrine visits after the 
interment and before 1982 for Beijing and 1996 for Seoul supports Tokyo’s argument. If 
the enshrinement of war criminals was the paramount issue in the controversy, then both 
governments would have objected immediately—either when the story broke or at the 
first occurrence of a prime ministerial visit after news of the enshrinement (which was 
April 1979 on both counts). That they did not suggests that both governments 
manufactured the problem. 
Tokyo’s argument, however, is weakened when one considers that the first 
objection from both governments referenced the war criminals. In this context, it is 
harder to dismiss Beijing and Seoul’s claim because to do so would require one to know 
definitively the reasons why each government objected to Yasukuni when they did. 
Otherwise, how can one argue that the war criminals were not part of each government’s 
calculus to object?  On the other hand, to say that the war criminals issue was the reason 
that Beijing responded in 1982 ignores the fact that Beijing followed the Yasukuni 
controversy with angst since 1969 when the Yasukuni Shrine bill was proposed in Tokyo. 
 93
2. Official Capacity of Visits 
The second unresolved issue in the Yasukuni controversy is the capacity in which 
Japanese prime ministers visited the shrine. This issue is a bit more complicated 
compared to the war criminals’ enshrinement, as the latter is a static argument (the war 
criminals were enshrined 17 October 1978) whereas the former is dynamic in that each 
prime minister’s conduct while visiting determined the extent of the problem. 
This thesis credits Prime Minister Suzuki with the first official visit to Yasukuni 
in August 1982. Once it was made known that Suzuki’s visits were official, Beijing 
consistently objected to them (of which there was only one more before he resigned), 
which weakens Tokyo’s argument. However, Beijing ignored all of Nakasone’s visits 
except for two (1983 and 1985), including four visits after his 1984 pronouncement that 
all his visits were in an official capacity. In this context, the four visits that Beijing 
ignored following Nakasone’s revelation suggest that Beijing manufactured the problem, 
thus supporting Tokyo’s claim. 
Suzuki and Nakasone’s pronouncements affected the ROK just as they did the 
PRC, but in Seoul’s case, the government ignored all the “official” visits from both prime 
ministers. Seoul caught up with the issue during Koizumi’s visits, but Seoul’s argument 
that the capacity of the visits stands at the center of the controversy is hindered severely 
by its dismissal of Suzuki and Nakasone’s visits. 
3. Summary 
The politicization of the war criminals and the capacity of prime ministerial visits 
is likely to continue as long as Tokyo’s national policy on Yasukuni stands at odds with 
Beijing and Seoul. Of the two politicization issues, it is the author’s assertion that the war 
criminals claim is the more legitimate agitator in the controversy as compared to the 
capacity issue. The war criminals’ enshrinement surfaced with nearly every official 
objection from both governments. The three years that Beijing ignored visits after 
learning of the enshrinement weakens its claim, but Beijing’s—and Seoul’s—consistency 
afterwards indicates that the issue is not manufactured. Moreover, even if the war 
criminals claim is being inflated, it is unlikely that Beijing or Seoul will drop the issue, 
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and the farther away the Yasukuni controversy gets from 1982, the less effective Tokyo’s 
rebuttal becomes. 
Tokyo stands a greater chance of influencing policy by charging Beijing and 
Seoul with manufacturing anti-Japanese nationalism on the official capacity issue. For 
Beijing, the four official visits in between its objections in 1982 and 1985 negate any 
claim that the official capacity of the visits is what it cannot tolerate. In Seoul’s case, too 
much time passed without objection since 1982 for that argument to be taken seriously. 
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The most compelling evidence supporting the argument of this chapter, and the 
thesis itself, is that both governments responded similarly to 93 percent of all visits, and 
that seven of those responses occurred when the ROK was democratizing. That two 
different political systems behaved the same way in response to a historically significant 
event reveals much about the similarities and differences in authoritarian regimes and 
democratic ones. Specifically, it demonstrates an area in which behavior of the two 
overlaps. With regard to Yasukuni, this finding can aid in assessing the likelihood of 
future incidents resulting in contention. 
It is important to note that the difference in political systems is but one factor 
contributing towards each government’s decision on how to respond to Yasukuni. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Seoul registered its first objection in 1996. By 1996, 
Seoul became a “high income” economy, evidenced by its ascension into the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.176  The same year saw Seoul 
lodge its first objection to Yasukuni. Meanwhile, in the PRC, a similar pattern of 
increased protests to Yasukuni preceded by increased levels of economic development 
emerged. But the PRC did not democratize (though various democratic elements have 
been adopted in the PRC in the late 1990s and 2000s). The similarities, therefore, suggest 
that democracy played a role, but it does not explain the reversal in response to Yasukuni 
                                                 
 176 On 12 December 1996, the ROK became the 29th country to join the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
accessed May 24, 2013, http://www.oecd.org. 
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in-and-of itself. Economic achievement likely guided both governments into greater 
assertiveness towards Japan’s Yasukuni policy. 
Additionally, the impacts of third country intervention (such as the United States 
or Soviet Union) over time significantly shaped Beijing and Seoul’s foreign and security 
policy, but were outside the scope of this study. Taken together with Korea’s example 
demonstrating an equally compelling link between the economy and foreign policy 
issues, both warn against monocausal explanations for governmental behavior. 
Perhaps more important than the observed trends and explanations is Beijing and 
Seoul’s intent in lodging official protests. The evidence shows that both governments fear 
revived militarism in Japan. Every official protest by either government contains 
language dissuading rightist currents in the Japanese government that could lead to a 
return to militarism. In protesting Yasukuni, Beijing and Seoul seek to influence Japanese 
foreign and security policy by reminding Japan of its imperialistic past in hopes that 
Tokyo will stop ignoring the lessons learned from that dark period. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to measure the impact of a difference in political 
systems on anti-Japanese nationalism. To this end, Japanese prime minister visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine proved useful in measuring this impact. Observers might expect that a 
transitional democracy would respond differently to a given stimulus than an 
authoritarian regime, but this study found that the difference in political system had little 
impact on governmental response to Yasukuni. Seoul and Beijing’s approach to Yasukuni 
revealed that more is at play than authoritarianism and democracy, or simply righting 
historical wrongs. Pursuit of national interests—be they diplomatic, economic, or 
security—combined with the nuances of political systems influence how each 
government responds to a historically sensitive issue. 
Echoing Stephan Haggard’s claim, governmental response to Yasukuni 
demonstrates the link between economic development and political institutions.177  The 
Korean case study suggests that the difference in political system had a significant impact 
on governmental response vis-à-vis Yasukuni because Seoul’s transition to democracy 
preceded its reversal in response. But what looked like democracy could have been 
mistaken for economic independence from Japan. Once the ROK was no longer 
dependent on Japanese economic aid, the government began to challenge Yasukuni 
where it previously had ignored. The PRC case study reinforces this finding: similar to 
the ROK, the PRC dramatically reversed its near complete non-response to consistent 
protest after Nakasone’s visit, yet China did not democratize. The conclusion is that the 
difference in political system had an impact, but the similar trends in response between 
the PRC and the ROK suggest that governmental response was impacted by political 
systems and economic development. 
                                                 
177 Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly 
Industrializing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 254. 
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A. THE LITERATURE, THE HISTORY, AND THE DATA 
1. The Literature 
The literature on Yasukuni highlights the cultural divide between Japan and its 
neighbors and stresses the destabilizing effects that Japanese prime minister visits to the 
shrine have on the region. Scholarship focuses on the Chinese perspective of the debate 
and misses the opportunity to compare Beijing and Seoul’s responses to Yasukuni to 
assess the impact the difference in political system had on governmental response to 
Yasukuni. Additionally, the literature on Yasukuni either lacks critical pieces of 
information (such as the Korean experience) or misrepresents information (Nakasone, for 
example, is credited with the first official visit when Suzuki did the same thing years 
earlier), or a combination of both, thus complicating appraisal of the Yasukuni problem. 
This study adds original information on the Yasukuni debate by focusing not on 
the controversy itself, but rather on Beijing and Seoul’s responses to it over time. In 
doing so, the study clarified discrepancies in the information regarding Japanese prime 
minister visits to the shrine and filled in the gaps previously overlooked by the literature, 
such as the South Korean side of the debate. 
2. The History 
To understand the depth of the problem one must know the origins of the debate. 
To this end, the study reviewed the core concepts of the Shinto faith and the unique role 
Shinto has in the Japanese culture. The study then provided a summary of the Yasukuni 
Shrine—from its origins in 1869 as a state sponsored war memorial, to its postwar 
privatization driven by a constitutional separation of religion from state. In 1978, the 
politics of enshrinement resulted in 14 Class A war criminals being interred at Yasukuni. 
Since then, neighboring states have politicized the issue, making Yasukuni a place of 
controversy rather than a place of peace. 
3. The Data 
The study surveyed all Japanese prime minister visits to Yasukuni since 1951. Of 
the 64 total visits, the preponderance were during the spring and autumn festivals and in 
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commemoration of the end of World War II. The data also revealed key dates and events 
that add clarity to the Yasukuni controversy: Prime Minister Miki was the first prime 
minister to commemorate the end of the war on 15 August 1975; Suzuki was the first 
prime minister to visit Yasukuni in his official capacity on 15 August 1982, and this visit 
also marked Beijing’s first official protest; Nakasone’s visit in 1985, while not a first in 
any sense, resulted in an 11-year hiatus of prime ministerial visits; Hashimoto’s 1996 
visit marked Seoul’s first objection to Yasukuni; and Koizumi’s 15 August 2006 visit 
was the last time a prime minister visited Yasukuni. 
B. POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
The purpose of the thesis was to assess the impact that different political systems 
had on governmental response to Yasukuni. To this end, the study detailed the typology 
of political systems and discussed the authoritarian regime in the PRC since its founding 
in 1949 and the ROK’s authoritarian regime since 1948 through its transition to 
democracy in 1988. In addition to the system, the study focused on the heads of state in 
both governments over the same period. 
The study concluded that political systems and state leadership impacted the 
approach taken to Yasukuni, but only minimally when compared to another state. That a 
democratic regime behaved similarly to an authoritarian regime dispels the belief that the 
two systems would react differently to a historically significant event. 
C. THE CASE STUDIES 
1. The PRC: Changing Leadership, Changing Trends 
The PRC case study assessed Beijing’s responses to the 64 Japanese prime 
minister visits to Yasukuni since 1951 and concluded that as state leadership changed, so 
too did Beijing’s response to Yasukuni.178  Under Mao, Beijing ignored all Japanese 
                                                 
 
 178 While the undeniable change in leadership coincided with the changed trend in response to 
Yasukuni, it should be noted that changes in China’s economic and security situation over the observed 
period significantly impacted the internal and external policies the regime pursued. The head of state 
directed the Party, but observers should compliment any assessment of state leadership with the 
developments in the strategic environment in which they served. 
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prime minister visits to Yasukuni. Despite internal Party assessments that China was 
weak and vulnerable, Mao constructed a “victors” narrative that suppressed anti-Japanese 
nationalism and drove China’s Japan policy, including such measures as refusing war 
reparations and ignoring prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni. 
Deng changed Beijing’s approach to Yasukuni. As China’s economy began to 
improve, its Japan policy changed, enabling Beijing to confront Chinese humiliation and 
suffering at the hands of Japan. Together with the enshrinement of Class A war criminals, 
Japanese prime minister visits to Yasukuni became too sensitive to ignore. Beijing lodged 
its first official complaint over Yasukuni in response to Suzuki’s 1982 visit. But, similar 
to his alternating economic advancement and retreat and social liberalization and 
suppression through the 1980s, Deng’s Yasukuni policy vacillated over time. Beijing 
ignored visits from 1978–1982, protested in 1982, ignored in early 1983 but protested 
later that year, ignored in 1984, and protested in 1985. 
Beijing’s leaders after Deng (Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao) used anti-Japanese 
nationalism to varying degrees as a mechanism to consolidate power. Beijing responded 
negatively to all visits from 1996 through 2006. Notable in this period of Chinese 
political economy is that China had become one of the largest economies in the world. 
2. The ROK: Changing Government, Changing Trends 
Seoul’s case provides a useful examination of responses to Yasukuni under both 
authoritarian and democratic banners. While authoritarian, Seoul ignored all Yasukuni 
visits. As a transitional democracy, Seoul reversed the trend of ignoring Yasukuni visits 
in favor of consistent negative responses from 1996 onward. 
Prior to Park Chung-hee, Seoul under Rhee Syngman sought to limit engagement 
with Japan. As a result, the ROK’s economic progress stagnated. After Park seized 
power, engagement with Japan was significantly broadened, seemingly at the expense of 
settling historical grievances. After Park’s assassination, Chun Doo-hwan’s pursuit of 
economic and security improvements revealed a mixed bag of contention and 
engagement with Japan. While he ignored all Yasukuni visits, Chun responded to the 
textbook controversy and led a massive anti-Japanese campaign in 1981–1982, all in the 
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midst of considerable loan requests from Japan. Chun then repaired relations with Japan 
under Nakasone (who at the same time was receiving significant opposition from Beijing 
on Yasukuni). 
In 1988, the ROK’s political system changed, and with it came a reversal in 
Seoul’s approach to Yasukuni. From 1996 onward, Seoul objected to Japanese prime 
minister visits to the shrine. Important to note, however, was that the ROK’s economic 
status had improved significantly from the economic slump that marked the early 1980s. 
In this context, the change in political system impacted Seoul’s Japan policy, but so too 
did the ROK’s improved economic status. 
3. Comparisons 
The results of the two case studies, when compared to one another, suggest that 
the difference in political system, while important in other aspects of fomenting or 
suppressing anti-Japanese nationalism, had little impact on overall governmental 
response to Yasukuni. Over ninety percent of all Japanese prime minister visits to 
Yasukuni over the observed period resulted in similar responses. Moreover, 100 percent 
of all visits after the ROK democratized resulted in similar behavior. 
The comparison also revealed similarities in trends between Seoul and Beijing. 
With the exception of Beijing’s vacillation on Yasukuni in the early 1980s, both 
governments responded negatively from 1996 onward. During that time, one government 
changed its political system, the other stayed the course; yet, the response was the same 
(thus weakening the claim that political systems impacted response). Both countries, 
however, realized significant improvements in global economic standing from the 1990s 
onward. Thus, the difference in political system had some impact on governmental 
response, but it alone does not explain the trend. 
D. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN 
Perhaps equally important to this thesis’s findings are the impacts of such on 
Tokyo’s calibration of national policy on prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni. The data 
suggests—absent predictive analysis—that August visits are more likely (50 percent) to 
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receive negative responses from Japan’s neighbors than visits during festivals or other 
random months.179  In this context, should Tokyo persist with prime ministerial visits to 
Yasukuni, it could avoid international outrage by prohibiting prime ministers from 
visiting in August. Using predictive analysis, the policy implications for Japan are more 
severe. Beijing and Seoul’s protests after every visit since 1996 suggests that the 
Yasukuni controversy is too entrenched in anti-Japanese emotion that any visit from a 
Japanese prime minister henceforth is likely to elicit a negative response.180  In this 
context, Tokyo would need to prohibit prime minister visits to Yasukuni to avert 
damaging relations with its neighbors. 
Another policy prescription in support of Tokyo’s current policy on Yasukuni 
focuses on economics. Prime ministers may visit Yasukuni and avoid negative responses 
from Beijing and Seoul if the visit occurs during an economic crisis or downturn in either 
country. If history repeats itself, economic dependence on Japan would cause Seoul or 
Beijing to ignore Yasukuni. 
If Tokyo ignores the negative responses that Yasukuni generates, it does so at 
potentially high cost. Korean and Chinese public opinion can and will link Yasukuni to 
other issues important to Japan, evidenced by the South Korean media reports in 1996 
linking Yasukuni to Dokdo and the Chinese protests in 2005 to Japan’s bid for permanent 
membership in the United Nations Security Council. In this context, the protests from the 
PRC and the ROK jeopardized Japan’s attainment of its national goals. On the other 
hand, by ceding its Yasukuni policy to outside actors, Japanese politicians stand to lose 
conservative voter support, which can impact the ruling party’s maintenance of political 
power. 
                                                 
179 The data revealed that of all 64 visits to Yasukuni, 43 (67 percent) occurred during the spring and 
autumn festivals, ten visits (16 percent) occurred in August, and 11 visits (17 percent) occurred outside of 
either festivals or August. Moreover, of the total 11 events that received official protest, the majority (45 
percent) were August visits. 
180 On 21 April 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo made a ritual offering of a pine tree to the 
Yasukuni Shrine. The gesture offended Chinese and Korean audiences, causing Beijing and Seoul to lodge 
official protest. Here, the prime minister did not even visit the shrine, and yet his actions still offended 
Japan’s neighbors. See “Prime Minister Abe’s war shrine offering likely to infuriate China,” The Asahi 
Shimbun, April 21, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com. 
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E. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Chinese proverb, “Past experience, if not forgotten, is a guide for the future” 
suggests that by ignoring its past, Japan risks a peaceful and harmonious future. China 
and Korea may never resolve their historical animosity towards Japan, but Japanese 
provocations like prime minister visits to Yasukuni aggravate the problem and only 
deepen the historical divide between Japan and its neighbors. Whether China or Korea is 
authoritarian or democratic matters little in the context of responding to historical 
grievances when compared to emotion and attitude of those who suffered at the hands of 
Japanese imperialism. The underlying motivation from both governments is to prevent a 
resurgence of Japanese militarism. The impetus behind that motivation may wax and 
wane in relation to each government’s goals and objectives at any given time (as this 
study demonstrates), but—regardless of Beijing or Seoul’s economic, security, or 
political standing—that underlying motivation is strong and will endure. How Japan 
embraces this reality is for Tokyo to decide, and perhaps it should take stock of what its 
policy on Yasukuni is in response to. 
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